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Karesh: Partnership Law and the Uniform Partnership Act in South Carolina

THE SOUTH CAROLINA DIVORCE ACT OF 1949

J. D.

SuMNIR,

JR.*

HISTORIcAIL BACKGROUND

Law in England Priorto 1857
Until the reign of Henry VIII marriage in England was looked
upon as a sacrament and therefore indissoluble.' This was because
the Roman Catholic faith, which was established in England after
the Norman Conquest, considered marriage as a contract of divine
origin rather than one of human convention; and the essential quali2
ties of this contract were deemed to be indissolubility and unity.
The belief that this law was promulgated by Christ and therefore
inviolable is still part of Catholicism today.5 Because of these religious convictions, the ecclesiastical courts, which had jurisdiction
over domestic cases, did not award absolute divorces during this
period of English history even though there was gross post nuptial
4
misconduct, such as adultery, by one of the spouses.
However, the ecclesiastical courts in England did award a divorce
a mensa et thoro which was nothing more than a judicial separation. 5
Such a separation could be had at the instance of either the husband
or the wife when the other party was guilty of post nuptial misbehavior which made further cohabitation impossible. Rigid proof
was required in such cases and the petitioning spouse had to show
that he was free from guilt. Since the divorce a inensa et thoro
did not dissolve the marriage, but only authorized a separation, a
party did not lose his marital right in the other's property. Moreover, neither could remarry to a third party. A divorce a inensa et
thoro ended at such time as the parties were reconciled.
The ecclesiastical courts, in addition to the divorce a mnensa et
thoro, granted annulments. These decrees of nullity did not dissolve the consummated bonds of marriage. They were merely judicial declarations that the marriage was null and void ab initio because of some invalididating impediment which existed at the time
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.

1. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOmrsnc RrLATiONs 256 (1936).
2. 1 BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE §§ 27, 28 (5th ed. 1873).
3. 2 VIRG IIA LAW WEKI.y DICTA 15 (1950).

4. BL. Comm. 188 (Gavit's ed. 1941).
5. Ibid.
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that the marriage was contracted. 6 Actually the court in such cases
decided that a valid bond of matrimony between the parties never
existed. Such annulments were known as decrees a vinculo. Impediments which were sufficient causes for a decree a vinculo were:
prior marriage, impotency, consanquinity in a forbidden degree and
want of age. 7 Unless there was one of the above impediments existing at the time the marriage took place, the decree a vinculo was
unobtainable since such annulments were not awarded for post marital difficulties. No absolute divorces were granted during this period.
The decrees a vinculo and a mensa et thoro were the only forms of
relief. Thus, many hardship cases existed because of no further recourse.

This situation aroused concern during the sixteenth century and
there is some evidence of divorces a uinculo natrimonii being
awarded. 8 However, the surge was quieted in 1601 when the Star
Chamber firmly reestablished the doctrine of indissolubility in England.9 But even after this dicision, numerous divorces were secured
by special acts of Parliament.' 0 Close political affiliations, as well as
money and time, were essential for those seeking such legislative divorces. Therefore commoners were seldom able to get the necessary
act of Parliament. This inequality aroused much concern in England
among the less fortunates. In addition, the Reformation wrought many
changes in public opinion. 11 Henry VIII appointed a Commission
to inquire into the possibility of revising the ecclesiastical code. The
Commissioners recommended many changes including the abolition
of the indissolubility doctrine, but they were not adopted.' 2 Yielding to public pressure Parliament enacted a statute in 1857 setting
up a Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes.' 3 This act removed

the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts to the newly created court
and established new divorce law in England.
Law in South Carolina Priorto 1949

The first court of chancery was established in South Carolina in
1721 by legislative act. 14 The tenth section of this act provided:
...that

the said Court shall proceed, adjudge and determine in

all cases brought into the said Court, as near as may be, accord6.

MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMSTIc RUEATIONs 257.

8.

MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIc RELATIONS

7. Br.. Com!. 185 (Gavit's ed. 1941).

258.

9. Rye v. Fuljambe, Moore 683, 72 Eng. Rep. 638 (1601).
10. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DoMESTrc RELATIONS
11. 1 BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIvoRcE § 30.

259.

12. Ibid.

13. 20 and 21 Vict. c. 85 (1857).
14. See Mattison v. Mattison, 1 Strob. Eq. 387 (S. C. 1847).
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ing to the known laws, customs, statutes and usages of the
Kingdom of Great Britain, and also, as near as may be, according to the known and established rules of his Majesty's High
Court of Chancery in South Britain.
However, no ecclesiastical courts were ever established in South
Carolina, or elsewhere in this country prior to or even after the
American Revolution. As a result of this situation, it was stated at
an early date that the equity courts in South Carolina did not have
the power to grant divorces. 15 This power was never exercised by
the English Chancery Courts, thus, it is not surprising to find the
South Carolina courts denying that they had such an inherent power.
This view has been uniformly followed throughout the United
States. 16 Due to the lack of ecclesiastical courts and the lack of
inherent power in the courts of equity, a definite grant of power was
needed to confer jurisdiction on the American Courts to grant divorces. This power was not forthcoming in South Carolina until
the year 1872.
As the result of no constitutional or statutory power being awarded
the courts, a statement was made as early as 1833 declaring that the
marriage contract in South Carolina was indissoluble and nothing
short of actual or presumed death could terminate it.17 The court
in the Boyce case did, however, reiterate the old common law presumption of death where a party was missing for a period of seven
years without having been heard from. In such a case the missing
party was at least constructively dead, and this instance was therefore no exception to the indissoluble rule.
In 1844 the South Carolina court was confronted with a case1 s
involving the power of the court to declare void a marriage which
was entered into by one who was non compos mnentis. This question
arose as a collateral issue in connection with the distribution of property left by the descendent. The marriage was voided on the premise that a marriage is a civil contract which can only be entered
into by competent persons. This action is to be distinguished from
a divorce in that in the former case the court says there was never
any marriage, while in the latter a valid marriage has been effected.
The power of the chancery court to award a decree a viculo, which
was recognized by the English ecclesiastical court was apparently
established. Yet some three years later in Mattison v. Mattison1 9
15. See Rhame v. Rhame, 1 McC. Eq. 195, 207 (S. C. 1826).
16. TIFFANY, PERSONS AND DOMESTIc RELATIONS § 97 (1896).
17. See Boyce v. Owens, 1 Hill L. 8, 10 (S. C. 1833).
18. Foster v. Means, Speers Eq. 569 (S. C. 1844).
19. 1 Strob. Eq. 387 (S. C. 1847).
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the court was confronted with the sole issue as to whether a court
of equity had the power to decree that a marriage was void at its
inception. It was held that this power was not in the chancery courts
of England, and thus our equity courts could not inherit the power,
and in order for equity to have such jurisdiction statutory authority
was necessary. The Mattison case was distinguished from the Foster
case on the ground that the validity of the marriage in the Foster
case had arisen as a collateral issue to a problem over which the court
had jurisdiction, whereas in the Mattison case the validity of the
marriage was the sole issue presented for litigation. The line drawn
between the two cases is thin. The problem in both cases was the
same- namely, did the court have the power or did it not have the
power. It is difficult to reconcile the cases on the basis of the manner in which they arose. Equity frequently takes jurisdiction over
a collateral issue in order that it might give complete relief to the
aggrieved party. Undoubtedly this was the reason for the decision
in Foster v. Means, but if it was, no such reason was given by the
court.
In 1858 the South Carolina court was again confronted with the
power of the court to void a marriage.2 0 In this case an uncle had
married his niece, and the validity of the marriage arose in connection
with the settlement of the deceased husband's estate. The chancellor
stated that marriage is a civil contract and can be set aside for a
civil disability, but that the marriage contract is unaffected by a
canonical incapacity arising from proximity of blood. It was further
said that neither the chancery in England nor the law courts had
cognizance of canonical disabilities, and in the absence of a statute
the courts of South Carolina do not. In this case the court again
distinguished between direct suits for voiding marriages and suits
where the legality of the marriage was only incidentally before the
court in connection with another issue.
In 1911, some 65 years after the Mattison case, the Supreme Court
of South Carolina did hold that the State courts have jurisdiction of
an action to declare a marriage null and void ab initio,2 1 but prior
to this case several statutes voiding certain types of marriages had
been enacted. However, no court was given jurisdiction to void these
marriages. The court stated that jurisdiction would be implied and
there was no necessity to provide that the courts would have the
required power. Thus, the court was of the opinion that the statutes
20. Bowers v. Bowers, 10 Rich. Eq. 551 (S. C. 1858).
21. Davis v. Whiltock, 90 S. C. 233, 73 S. Er 171 (1911).
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carried with them the right to have the marriage status adjudicated
by a competent judicial body.
Returning to the early South Carolina divorce cases, we discover
another case 22 decided before the Civil War where the occasion was
taken to express the old view that marriage contracts are indissoluble
by human means in this state.
When the Constitution of 1868 was adopted the following provision relating to divorces was inserted: "The courts of common pleas
shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all cases of divorce".2 3 And a
parallel section is found in a subsequent part: "divorces... shall not
be allowed but by the judgment of a court as shall be prescribed by
law".24
Some four years later the legislature enacted the necessary statutes
providing for divorces in South Carolina. This Act provided that
divorces were to be granted for adultery and desertion for a period
of two years.
The Act of 1872 was short-lived as it was repealed some six years
after its enactment.28
There are no reported cases in South Carolina granting a divorce
under the Act of 1872. As a matter of fact, the reports contain
only one decision which was decided under this Act. This is the
case of Grant v. Grant.2 7 In this case the husband sought a divorce
from his wife on the ground of adultery. The suit was commenced
on December 12, 1878, and the Act of 1872 was repealed on December 20, 1878. On appeal the lower court's dismissal was upheld despite of petitioner's contentions that there was an impairment of the
obligation of contract and that he was entitled to the divorce under
the 1868 constitution. The court held that the contract clause of
the Federal Constitution pertains to questions of property and
not matrimonial status. In addition, the court held that under the
phrase ".... that divorces shall not be allowed but by judgment of a
court, as shall be prescribed by law . . ." a specific law authorizing
the courts to grant the divorce decree was necessary. No such law
existed when the petitioner's case came up for trial.
After the repeal of the 1872 Act the State was once again without a divorce law. The constitutional provisions of 1868 were retained, but the specific law necessary under Article 14, Section 5 was
22. McCarty v. McCarty, 2 Strob. L. 6 (S. C. 1847).
23. S. C. CoNsTiT. Art. IV, § 15 (1868).

24. S. C. CosTrr. Art. XIV, § 5 (1868).
25. 15 S. C. STAT. AT LARGE 30 (1872).
26. 16 S. C. STAT. AT LARGE 719 (1878).

27. 12 S. C. 29 (1879).
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not provided by the Legislature. When a new State Constitution
was drawn in 1895 the useless divorce articles in the Constitution
of 1868 were omitted, and this article adopted: "'Divorces from the
28
bonds of matrimony shall not be allowed in this State."
In addition to refusing the right to judicial divorces, South Carolina never awarded any legislative divorces as many states in this
country did.
South Carolina has been highly praised by the Court of a sister
state for its refusal to grant divorces in the following quote: "In
South Carolina, to her unfading honor,a divorce has not been granted
since the Revolution." 2 9 (This statement is accurate so far as reported cases are concerned, but otherwise is incorrect.)
For over half a century the provision of the 1895 Constitution
remained unaltered and divorces from the bonds of matrimony were
not granted in the State. The prevailing reason for the disallowment of divorces in South Carolina was expressed by Judge O'Neall.0 °
He was of the opinion in the year 1847 that the Legislature, Bench,
Bar, and people frowned upon divorces and nobly refused to permit
them because of the injunction, "Those whom God has joined together, let no man put asunder." He also believed that this stern policy
had been to the good of the people and the State. The opinion of
Judge O'Neall can be traced to the Roman Catholic beliefs and the
views prevailing in England after the Norman Conquest and prior
to 1857. And in an 1848 case3 l Judge O'Neall took occasion to express the thought that the law holding marriage ties indissoluble came
entirely from the teachings of the New Testament. It is surprising
to find such views prevailing in a State where most of its citizens
were largely Protestants.
There was some feeling in the State that the practice of refusing
divorces was without merit. From the bench in 1818 Nott, J. said:
Where divorces are not allowed for any cause whatever, we
sometimes see men of excellent characters unfortunate in their
marriages, and virtuous women abandoned or driven away houseless by their husbands, who would be doomed to celibacy and
solitude if they did not form connections which the law does not
allow, and who make excellent husbands and virtuous wives still.
Yet they are considered as living in adultery, because a rigor28. S. C. CoNsTrr. Art. XVII, §3 (1895).
29. See Head v. Head, 2 Kelly 191, 196 (Ga. 1847).
30. See McCarty v. McCarty, 2 Strob. L.6, 11 (S.C. 1847).
31. See City Council of Charleston v. Benjamin, 2 Strob. L. 508, 523 (S.C.
1848).
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ous and unyielding law, from motives of policy alone, has ordained it so. 32
But even so, the public policy along these lines never changed considerably until 1949 when the following constitutional amendment
was adopted: "Divorces from the bonds of matrimony shall be allowed on grounds of adultery, desertion, physical cruelty, or habitual
drunkenness." 3 3
Pursuant to this constitutional power the Legislature in the same
year adopted a divorce law for South Carolina 34 - her first since
1878- thereby South Carolina became the 48th State to award divorces a vinculo -natrimonii.
In the subsequent pages of this article each section of the 1949
Act will be set out and discussed. As can be imagined it would be
impossible to give complete treatment to each section, even though
such would be highly desirable. Each section will be generally discussed with the hope that this article will be of some benefit to the
lawyers of South Carolina and the students of the School of Law
at the -University.
The general rules on divorce that have long been established elsewhere are the ones which will receive treatment in this article. These
principles have been in effect for many decades in other states, and
with but few exceptions are followed in this country. It is the belief of this writer that the South Carolina Court will rely upon this
well-settled body of law. This belief is supported by the decisions
in Brown v. Brown, Jeffords v. Jeffords and Thons v. Thomas.
In those cases the Court freely quoted and cited the usual rules found
in the decisions of other courts; AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE; CORPUS
JURIS SECUNDUM; NELsON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT (2d ed.),
etc.

THE DIVORCE ACT or 1949
SECTION 1: Bring Divorce Actions Only in Court of Common
Pleas.- Actions for divorce from the bonds of matrimony shall
in all cases be only in the equity' jurisdiction of the Court of
Common Pleas.
In England at early common law a suit for a divorce a mensa et
thoro was always brought in the ecclesiastical courts, and the proceeding was in the form of a civil action. 3 5 Divorce suits in this
32. See Cusack v. White, 2 Mill's Constit. 279, 292 (S. C. 1818).
33. 46 S. C. STAT. AT LARGE 138 (1949).

34. Id. at 216.
35. 2

BisHop, MARRIAGE AND DivoRct
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country, likewise, have been traditionally regarded as civil in nature
rather than criminal, 30 although one learned judge has contended
that regulations on marriage and divorce are part of the criminal
rather than civil administration of justice.3 7 If a person is guilty
of an offense which is a ground for divorce and is also the basis of
a criminal prosecution, a judgment in one of the cases cannot be
pleaded as a defense to the other. Certainly if divorce were a criminal action one suit would be a bar to the other. A divorce suit is
really an action sounding in tort for the redress of a private wrong
and not an action based on the marriage contract. Therefore-, the
Legislature has followed the established view of the other states by
providing that actions for the dissolution of a marriage shall be
brought in the Court of Common Pleas.
The various issues which were raised in a matrimonial suit in the
ecclesiastical courts were not tried by a jury, but rather by the Chancellor. It was he and not jurymen who decided all questions of law
and fact.38 Since our equity courts are an offspring of the old
ecclesiastical courts, though not equivalent thereto, many of the states
have provided for the hearing of divorce suits on the equity rather
than the legal side of the court.3 9 Even though this is historically
sound, it is not followed in some states where such suits are handled
as legal rather than equitable proceedings. 40 Today many states provide for jury trials. By providing for equitable proceedings in divorce suits the South Carolina Legislature has precluded the right
to a trial by jury. It is the belief of this writer that Section 1 of the
South Carolina Divorce Act is sound. The issues in divorce cases at
times become quite intricate and bulky. It would seem that a trained
judge could follow these many issues better than laymen on a jury.
And due to the state's vital interest in the matrimonial status of its
citizens, the Legislature has considerably lessened the chances of
favoritism and bias by providing for trial in equity rather than law
where a jury can be had. Many equitable issues are involved in the
termination of a marriage: such as, injunctions against interference
with personal liberties, custody of children, alimony, changes of
names, etc. Traditionally such matters have long rested in the jurisdiction of the equity courts. Thus it would seem that divorce suits
should be brought in equity because of tradition and because of the
very nature of the various questions presented for determination.

36. WA^RN, ScHouLm DxvoRcE

MANUAL § 9 (1944).
37. See Barber v. Barber, 10 Mass. 260, 265 (1813).
38. 2 Bisnop, MARIUAGZ AND DIvoRcE § 256.
39. 2 V mxum, AmEwcAN FAmILY LAWS § 85 (1932).
40. Ibid.
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SECTION 2. Divorceable Grounds.-No divorce from the bonds
of matrimony shall be granted except upon one or more of the
following grounds, to wit:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Adultery.
Desertion for a period of one (1) year.
Physical cruelty.
Habitual drunkenness.

We have seen that the equity courts in the United States never
considered themselves as having inherent jurisdiction to grant divorces. It follows that one must look to a statutory grant of this
right before he can expect relief, and further his grievance against
his spouse must be covered by the grounds for divorce that are set
forth in the legislation. Divorce is therefore a privilege in the United
States and not a vested right. It being a mere privilege, it can be
abolished at any time. This point was before the South Carolina
",previously mentioned,
Court at an early date in Grant v. Gra 41
which arose under the South Carolina divorce act that was enacted
during the Reconstruction Era. A suit for divorce was filed some
eight days before the state divorce laws were repealed by the Legislature. A divorce was denied the plaintiff over his objection that
there had been a violation of Art. I, Sec. 10 of the Federal Constitution. The court's reason for this conclusion was in essence that
the Contract Clause has regard to questions of property and not to
a matrimonial status.
There is a total of thirty-nine grounds for divorce in the United
States.42 These causes are very limited in some states, e. g., in New
York adultery is the sole ground ;43 while in others there are many
causes. Kentucky, where some fifteen are listed, has more than
any of the other states. 44 The grounds in this country range from
adultery and desertion to such seemingly minor offenses as public
defamation of the other spouse and vagrancy on the part of the husband. 4 5 A unique feature about South Carolina is that her grounds
for divorce appear in an amendment to the State Constitution as
well as in the Act.
Many states have a statute of limitations relating to the time within which the divorce action must be started. No such provision has
been made in the South Carolina Act. However, since the action
41. 12 S. C. 29 (1879).

42. 2 Vtawnm, AuzRICAN FAmILY LAWS § 62.
43. CAHILL, CIVIL Pauc. AcT § 1147 (1925).
44. 2 VlMNnm, AmRICAN FAMILY LAWS § 62.

45. Ibid.
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is brought in equity, the equitable doctrine of laches would probably
be applicable where there has been a long delay in bringing the suit.
The four grounds in South Carolina will now be taken up in the
order in which they are listed in the Act.
1. Adultery. Adultery is a ground for divorce in every state.
Moreover, in New York46 it is the only recognized cause. The state
of New York awards 40% of the divorces secured in the United
States for adultery, whereas unfaithfulness is the cause for only 4%o
of the total obtained elsewhere. 47 In 1932 only five divorces for
adultery were given by the state of Nevada while some 3,987 decrees were granted for other causes. 48 According to a survey recently made by the writer, approximately 6%o of the divorces granted
inSouth Carolina thus far have been for adultery.
Adultery has been defined as voluntary sexual intercourse by a
married person with a person other than the offender's spouse. 49
Excluding South Carolina, a single act of such intercourse by either
the husband or wife is sufficient cause for divorce in all of the states
except Kentucky and Texas. Adultery in Kentucky is described as
the living in adultery by either, or a single act by the wife, or lewd
conduct by the wife.50 In Texas it is defined as a wife taken in adultery, or a husband who abandons his wife and lives in adultery. 51
For many years North Carolina discriminated against the wife, as
do Kentucky and Texas, but this discrimination has now been abol52
ished.
Criminal adultery in South Carolina is defined by the following
statute: "Adultery is the living together and carnal intercourse with
each other, or habitual intercourse with each other without living
together, of a man and woman, when either is lawfully married to
some other person."'53 From this statute it is easily discernable that
more than one act is required. A living together or habitual intercourse must be proved in order to make out the criminal offense.
The South Carolina Court has never prescribed its requirements
for adultery as a ground for divorce. At the time that our Constitutional Amendment and Act were adopted, the Legislature knew
of the requirements in the other states. It seems reasonable that
46. CAHILL, CIVIL PROC. ACT § 1147 (1925).
47. JACOBS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DomESTIc RELATIONS 421 (2d ed.
1939).
48. Ibid.
49. 1 BIsHop, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 703; WARREN, SCHOULER DIVORCE
MANUAL § 59.

50. Baker v. Baker, 136 Ky. 617, 124 S. W. 866 (1910).
51. O'Farrell v. O'Farrell, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 51, 119 S. W. 899 (1909).
52. 2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 50-5 (1942).
53. S. C. CODE § 1436 (1942).
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if they had deemed that more than one act was necessary, they would
have made provision therefor. This they did not do. In view of
the fact that all but two of the other states say one act is sufficient
cause, and due, to the unqualified listing of adultery in the Act, it is
doubtful that the Supreme Court of South Carolina will adopt the
criminal definition set forth above. It is hard to conceive of the
court requiring the same quantum of infidelity for a civil divorce proceeding as it does for a criminal prosecution. Only one case 4 involv,ing adultery has been before the Court since the passage of the new
Act. In this case the petitioner testified that her husband had made
love to her sister-in-law in her presence, and that on one occasion
she found the husband in bed with the sister-in-law. The court
held that the wife was not entitled to a divorce on the basis of such
uncorraborated testimony. The opportunity to define adultery under
the divorce law was not seized by the Justices. By implication
it might be said that the Court regards one act as sufficient. If
more than one act is required, the Court could certainly have so
stated this fact without going into the matter of the sufficiency of
the evidence.
Since adultery is generally defined as voluntary sexual intercourse,
it follows that infidelity by one who is insane5 5 or under coercion, 56
as in the case of rape, is not adultery, because there is no voluntary
act in these situations. Moreover, intercourse by a wife with a man
whom she mistakenly believes to be her husband is not an unfaithful
act entitling the husband to a divorce.57 Such ignorance on the part
of the wife is almost unbelievable. Another instance where a mistake
of fact prevents an act of intercourse from being adultery is where
a woman marries a person with whom she has sexual relations under
the belief that her first husband is dead. 58 However, infidelity by
one who is intoxicated has been held to be a ground for divorce even
though the person claimed he did not know what he was doing.5 9
And the authorities agree that sexual relations with another person
54. Brown v. Brown, 215 S. C. 502, 56 S. E. 2d 330 (1949) noted in 2 S. C.
L. Q. 286 (1950). See the definition given by Johnston, Ch. in Hull v. Hull, 2
Strob. Eq. 174, 187 (1846).

55. Wray v. Wray, 19 Ala. 522 (1851), 33 Ala. 187 (1858); Nichols v.

Nichols, 31 Vt. 328 (1858). Contra: Matchin v. Matchin, 6 Pa. 332 (1847).
56. Johnson v. Johnson, 78 N. J Eq. 507, 80 Ati. 119 (1911).
57. TiFrANY, PERSONS AND DoMEsTic RELATiONS § 98.
58. Valleau v. Valleau, 6 Paige 207 (N. Y. 1836). This is not true where
she continues living with him after the first husband returns. Mathewson v.
Mathewson, 18 R. L 456, 28 AtI. 801 (1894).
59. Miller v. Miller, 140 Md. 60, 116 Atl. 840 (1922).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1951

11

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 3 [1951], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTRLY

by one who is separated from his spouse is adultery entitling the innocent party to a divorce. 60
As is true in most instances, mistake of law is not allowed as a
defense where adultery is alleged. Thus, an act of intercourse with
a second wife by one who believes he has the right to have several
wives is nonetheless adulterous ;61 as is intercourse after a second
marriage where the divorce from the first marriage was void.6a
Likewise, many persons have been held guilty of unfaithfulness where
a second marriage was had by a spouse who believed that he could
validly remarry after having been abandoned by his first wife.6
One of the most troublesome features about adultery as a ground
for divorce is the matter of proof. Testimony by eyewitnesses is
very rarely obtainable, therefore such charges must be established
by circumstantial evidence. This difficulty has been excellently explained in the following well-known quotation:
It is not necessary to prove the direct fact of adultery, for, being
committed in secret, it is seldom susceptible of proof except by
circumstances which, however, are sufficient whenever they would
lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man to a
64
conclusion of guilt.
Thirty-two states in this country have statutes which specify that
a divorce for adultery cannot be awarded upon the uncorroborated
testimony of the parties. 65 And in the other remaining jurisdictions
the courts strictly weigh the evidence in such cases. The main reason
for this severity is to prevent collusion between the parties. This
strickness has as its origin a rule which was adopted by the English
Ecclesiastical Courts. 68 Although there is no pertinent statute in South
Carolina, it was held in the recent Brown case8 7 that a divorce will
not be granted in South Carolina on the uncorroborated testimony
of the parties. In the Brown case the court stated that the evidence
required to establish adultery must be clear and positive, and that
it must be sufficiently definite as to time, place and circumstances.
However, a clear preponderance of the evidence is sufficient and it is
unnecessary to negate every reasonable hypothesis as is required in
60.
man,
61.
62.
63.

Watts v. Watts, 160 Mass. 464, 36 N. E. 479 (1894) ; Freeman v. Free82 N. J. Eq. 360, 88 AtI. 1071 (1913).
1 BIsHoP, MARnIAGZ AND DIvoRc § 713.
Ackerman v. Ackerman, 220 N. Y. 72, 93 N. E. 192 (1910).
Dunn v. Dunn, 156 Miss. 132, 125 So. 562 (1930); Moors v. Moors, 121

Mass. 232 (1876).

64. See Loveden v. Loveden, 2 Hagg. Constit. 2.
65. 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 86.
66. See Robinson v. Robinson, 1 Swa. and Tr. 362 (1858).
67. 215 S. C. 502, 56 S. B. 2d 330 (1949), noted in 2 S. C. L. Q. 286 (1950).
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criminal cases. New Jersey does require proof beyond a reasonable
68
doubt.
The birth of a child to the wife, before or after the passing of the
normal period for gestation since the last access of the husband, is
frequently used as evidence of adultery. The results in such cases
depend on the time involved. In one case69 331 days had passed
since the last access of the husband, yet the court held that this
alone was insufficient to establish infidelity, and the same result was
reached in another case where the first access by the husband was
7 months before the birth of the child to the wife.70 In cases where
there is an allegation of illegitimacy it is well to bear in mind the
strong presumption that a child born to a parent in wedlock is presumed to be legitimate.
2. Desertionfor a Period of (1) Year. Desertion is a ground for
divorce in all of the states except North Carolina and New York. The
statutory period of desertion required varies from one year in many
states to five years in Rhode Island.7 1 One year is the time prescribed in 21 states, two years in eleven, three years in eleven, five
years in one, and no statutory period is provided for in two states
(Louisiana and New Mexico). Divorces for desertion have substantially decreased in this country. It was the most popular ground
until 1932, accounting for about 40% of the decrees, but in 1932
only 28%'o of all divorces were for desertion.7 " The reason for this
decline is undoubtedly due to the delay brought about by the statutory periods involved. In contrast to this decline, it is interesting
to note that approximately 53%7 of all of the divorces granted in
South Carolina have been for desertion.
Desertion is the wilful and unjustifiable abandonment of one of
the spouses for the statutory period by the other, without the former's consent, and with an intention of not returning.7 3 Hence, by
its very definition five elements must be present in order to make
out the offense: (1) cessation of cohabitation, (2) for the statutory period, (3) intent to abandon, (4) want of consent on the part
of the one abandoned and (5) unwarranted abandonment.
Spouses are entitled to each other's companionship and cohabita68. Gray v. Gray, 100 N. J. Eq. 71, 135 At. 54 (1926).

Other courts re-

quire a higher standard of proof in divorce cases than in other civil cases. J'ACOBS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DoMsTIc RELATIoNs 424.
69. Gaskill v. Gasldl, [1921] P. 425.

70. Taylor v. Taylor, 123 App. Div. 220, 108 N. Y. Supp. 428 (1908).
Annotation 21 A. L. R. 1457.

See

71. 2 VERNIER, AmCAN FAMY LAws § 67.
72. JACOBS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DoMzsTc RELATIONS 429.
73. WARRN, ScHouLR, DVORCE MANUAL, § 112.
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tion because of their marriage. To cohabit is to live together as
husband and wife. Therefore, when they live apart from each other
there is no cohabitation, even though the husband continues to support his wife. When the parties cease to cohabit the first requirement of desertion is established.
The cessation of cohabitation must be for the required statutory
period before there is desertion-under divorce laws. The separation
has to continue for the whole time that is necessary and it must be
continuous. No tacking on is allowed. If cohabitation is resumed
for the briefest period, desertion ceases to exist because the statutory period is calculated from the last abandonment.7 4
Intent to abandon is an indispensable part of desertion. A mere
severance or absence from each other is insufficient. The cessation
of cohabitation and the intent to abandon do not always coincide. So
even though there might be a separation, desertion does not start
until that time when the intent is formed or manifested by the abandoning spouse.7 5 The formation of this intent is a question of fact
which can be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Oftentimes parties temporarily live apart from each other because of
differences that have come between them, sickness, business or for
other reasons. In such cases there is no desertion until one of the
parties has formed an intent to desert and this state of mind is seldom formed at the time of separation in the listed instances. Where
one leaves his spouse with the intent to abandon and he thereafter
becomes insane, but before an absence for the statutory period, no
divorce is obtainable by the non-consenting party because the insane
spouse did not have the necessary capacity during his absence.7
However, if he becomes insane after having been absent for the
specified time and with the intent of abandoning, a divorce can be
had because the offense was established before the insanity had commenced. 77 On the other hand, where there is desertion for less than
the statutory period by one who is imprisoned v8 or drafted into the
military service, 79 he is not excused, unless there is strong evidence
of a change of mind before the running of the time prescribed.
Nothing is better settled than the rule that an abandonment by
mutual consent cannot be relied upon as a ground for divorce. Hence,
74. La Flanune v. La Flarnme, 210 Mass. 156, 96 N. E. 62 (1911).

75. Sheehan v. Sheehan, -156 Md. 656, 145 At. 180 (1929);

SoNs AND Do iEsTIc RELATIoNs § 102.

76.
20-93
77.
78.
79.

TIFFANY,

Carr v. Carr, 209 Iowa 160, 225 N. W. 948 (1929). But see
(1950).
Fisher v. Fisher, 54 W. Va. 146, 46 S. E. 118 (1903).
Davis v. Davis, 102 Ky. 402, 43 S. W. 168 (1897).
Margulies v. Margulies, 92 N. J. Eq. 322, 112 Atl. 484 (1921).
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if there is a legal separation or separate support order obtained by
the parties by mutual agreement, divorce is not available because
there is consent rather than a want of it.80 Desertion can be complained of only when it is without the consent of the abandoned party.
However, where there is a mutual separation and one declines to renew cohabitation in response to an offer by the other, there is desertion as of then by the one refraining.8 1 If one of the spouses
abandons the other against the other's will, but he thereafter makes
an offer to return which is refused, the abandoning party is no longer
a deserter.82 At the same time though, the one who rejects the offer
to return is guilty of desertion as of the time of the rejection. In
such situations the offer to return must be made in good faith.83
Occasionally no offer to return is made because of some manifestation by the abandoned party that the other would not be taken back.
If such manifestation is made, the abandoned one can't rely upon the
other's continuing away.8 4 Nevertheless, mere silence by the originally abandoned spouse is insufficient.
In order for the abandonment to constitute desertion it must be
unjustifiable, that is to say without cause. The other party must
85
not be guilty of such misconduct as to justify the other in leaving.
Traditionally, the husband has the right to establish the home of the
family. This privilege must rest in one of the family, and the chosen
one is the husband. This is because the husband and wife were considered to have been united into one at common law and the merger
left only the husband in the eyes of the law. Hence, a wife's refusal
to accompany her husband to a new home is unwarranted.8 6 However, the husband on such an occasion must act in good faith and
in a reasonable manner.8 7 The courts in the United States are
split on whether a husband is justified in leaving his wife when she
refuses to have intercourse with him. 88 Where there is no real
80. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIoNs § 86.
81. Boyd v. Boyd, 177 Md. 687, 11 A. 2d 461 (1940) ; Carroll v. Carroll, 68
N. J. Eq. 727, 61 Ati. 383 (1905).
' 82. Cusick v. Cusick, 129 N. J.Eq. 82, 18 A. 2d 292 (1941); Kline v. Kline,
179 Md. 10, 16 A. 2d 924 (1940).
83. Kohler v. Kohler, 94 N. J. Eq. 474, 120 Atl. 34 (1923). For a good discussion of this point see Bohmert v. Bohmert, 241 N. Y. 446, 150 N. E. 511
(1926).
84. Underwood v. Underwood, 271 Fed. 553, 50 App. D. C. 323 (1921).
85. WARREN, SCHOULER DIVORCE MANUAL § 120.
86. Hoffhimes v. Hoffhimes, 146 Md. 350, 126 Atl. 112 (1924) ; Franklin v.
Franklin, 190 Mass. 349, 77 N. E. 48 (1906).
87. Watkins v. Watkins, 202 Ky. 141, 259 S. W. 20 (1923); Bibb v. Bibb, 39
Cal. App. 406, 179 Pac. 214 (1919).
88. WARREN, SCHOULER DIVORCE MANUAL § 120; 1 BIsHoP, MARRIAGE AND

DivoRca 778.
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basis for this refusal it seems that the husband should be justified
in leaving. Here there is no cohabitation in that there is no intercourse and one of the principal reasons for, and privileges of, marriage has been lost. Some authorities, though they are few, say
that in order to make out a case of constructive desertion there must
be such misconduct on the part of the other spouse as would enable
him or her to obtain a divorce. 89
3. Physical Cruelty. Cruelty is a ground for divorce in fortyfour states. Of these states only two, other than South Carolina,
specifically limit it to physical cruelty so as to prevent giving it a
broader definition. While there are just seven states which expressly list mental cruelty as a ground, the majority of the states do
grant divorces for mental cruelty. 90 Four states discriminate against
the husband and one against the wife. In 1932, 42.7%o of the divorces obtained in the United States were for cruelty, 91 while the
figures in South Carolina show that physical cruelty has accounted
for approximately 24% of the decrees granted. The phraseology
of the various statutes in this country differs so much that generalizations are difficult, if not almost impossible.
Physical cruelty is generally said to be actual personal violence,
or such a course of physical treatment as endangers life, limb or
health and renders cohabitation unsafe.92 In deciding what is physical cruelty the court considers the parties' station in life as well as
the attending circumstances of the alleged act.93 Usually one act
is insufficient, but it can be, where it is a result of a deliberately fixed
intention to abuse. 94 The kind of cruelty is immaterial as long as
it is bodily, as distinguished from mental injury. Several jurisdictions have awarded divorces on the basis of physical cruelty where
the husband compelled the wife against her wishes and remonstrances
to submit to excessive sexual intercourse, the effect of which was to
endanger her life.95 These cases seem correct. Granted the injury
might not be readily apparent, still the woman is physically injured
as much as she would have been with an injury made by a knife. Another question along this line is the one of venereal diseases. If one
89. Holmstedt v. Holmstedt, 383 Ill. 290, 49 N. E. 2d 25 (1943); Craig v.

Craig, 89 Ark. 40, 117 S. W. 765 (1909) ; ibid.
90. 2 VERNIER, AMERiCAN FAMILY LAWS § 66.

91. JACOBS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DomEsTic RELATIONS 416.
92. See Brown v. Brown, 215 S. C. 502, 508, 56 S. E. 2d 330, 333 (1949).
93. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIc RELATIONS §§ 84, 85; WARREN,.
ScHouLm DIVORCZ MANUAL § 68.

94. Hastings v. Hastings, 147 Md. 177, 127 At. 743 (1925); WARREN.
DIVORcE MANUAL § 71. See Brown v. Brown, 215 S. C. 502, 509

SCHOU ER

56 S. E. 2d 330,333 (1949).
95. WARREN, SCHOULE Divoacx MANUAL § 89.
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of the parties is responsible for communicating a venereal disease
to the other, is this physical cruelty? The courts which have been
confronted with such cases have held that it is. 96
In the United States there is no right to chastize a wife. Provocation should be given consideration though.
The fact that the attacking party was intoxicated is no defense
to a suit for divorce based on physical cruelty. 97 However, insanity at the time of the cruelty is a bar.98 But if the insanity occurs after
the commission of the act, it has no effect. 99
The South Carolina Court has had one case 100 involving physical
cruelty. The petitioner alleged that her husband had slapped her
twice and pinched her. She stated that as a result of the pinch she
suffered some pain. In this case the Court described physical cruelty as actual personal violence, or such a course of physical treatment
as endangers life, limb or health, and renders cohabitation unsafe.
The court also stated that a continuing course of personal violence
producing physical pain or bodily injury and a fear of future danger are recognized as sufficient cause for a divorce for physical cruelty. However, it was pointed out that not every slight violence, even
though in anger, authorized a divorce. In the Brown case the court
also took the opportunity to say that one act is not sufficient unless
it is so severe and atrocious as to endanger life, or unless the act
indicates an intention to do severe bodily harm, or causes reasonable
apprehension of serious danger in the future. A single act of aggravated cruelty may, however, warrant a divorce if accompanied with
such attending circumstances as to satisfy the court that the acts
are likely to be repeated.
Most states today allow divorces on the ground of mental cruelty
even though the cruelty required in those jurisdictions must be extreme, severe or violent. 1 1 Due to the specification of physical cruelty in the constitutional amendment and the definition given it by the
Court, no divorce will probably be allowed in this state for mental
cruelty. It is possible to visualize a course of mental cruelty that
would result in injury to the innocent spouse's health or mind, and
for which a divorce should be granted. But even so, this is not ac96. Kline v. Kline, 179 Md. 10, 16 A. 2d 924 (1940); Campbell v. Campbell,
129 Pa. Super. 106, 194 Atl. 760 (1937).
97. Maxwell v. Maxwell, 69 W. Va. 414, 71 S. E. 571 (1911); WAmzzN,
ScHouLER DIVORCE MANUAL § 93.

98. Kunz v. Kunz, 171 Minn. 258, 213 N. W. 906 (1927) ; Walker v. Walker,

140 Miss. 340, 105 So. 753 (1925).
99. Jordan v. Jordan, 257 S. W. 569 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) ; Steed v. Steed,
54 Utah 244, 181 Pac. 445 (1919).
100. Brown v. Brown, 215 S. C. 502, 56 S. E. 2d 330 (1949).
101. 2 VEaNmnR, AmmtUc.A FAMULY LAWS § 66.
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tual personal violence or a course of physical treatment as endangers
life, limb or health. If the Court once allowed a divorce for the
type of mental cruelty described above, the door would be opened
for further leniencies. This writer does not believe that physical
cruelty should be broadened so as to include mental cruelty, though
it be of a severe nature. Neither does he believe that the Court will
ever adopt such a principle because of the Court's expressed intent
to be strict in construing and administering our divorce law.
4. Habitual Drunkenness. Intoxication is a ground for divorce in
thirty-nine states. Of these jurisdictions only two discriminate between the spouses.' 0 2 The statutes in eighteen states set forth a
time that the offense must endure, and in the others the required time
is a matter of judicial inference from such words as habitual, addicted
to, continued, etc. In 1932 only 1.47 of all of the divorces granted
in the United States were for intoxication.103 Approximately 177
of the divorces obtained in this state have been for habitual drunkenness.
Habitual drunkenness is the frequent indulgence in the use of alcohol that leads to a fixed and irresistable habit of drunkenness whereby the accused loses all of his power or will to control his appetite
for intoxicating liquors.10 4 It is not the ordinary or occasional use
of alcohol, but the habitual use of it, that gives rise to habitual
drunkenness. However, there is no requirement of showing that
the defendant remains drunk all of the time. It is sufficient to show
that he had the fixed habit of frequently getting drunk which made
it impossible for him to resist when the opportunity and temptation
were presented.
According to most of the courts in this country, the excessive use
of drugs or narcotics is not habitual drunkenness notwithstanding
the fact that the effects are the same.1 0 5 Even though this view is
oftentimes called the better view on this point, it does not seem right.
People can get just as intoxicated from using drugs as from using
of alcohol. And many persons become addicted to the use of drugs
and narcotics as some do with alcohol. If this use of drugs or narcotics leads to habitual drunkenness it should be a ground for divorce. The sale and use of narcotics are regulated more closely by
law than are the use and sale of alcohol. Our drug laws are very
102. 2 VERN=fa, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 70.
103. JACOBS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DoMESTic

RELATIONs 459.104. See Lecates v. Lecates, 190 At. 294, 296 (Del. 1937) ; WARREN, SCHOUL-

ER DIVORCE MANUAL § 54.

105. E. g., Hayes v. Hayes, 86 Fla. 350, 98 So. 66 (1923); Smith v. Smith,
7 Boyce 283, 105 At. 833 (Del. 1919); Youngs v. Youngs, 130 Ill. 230, 22
N. E. 806 (1889).
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stringent. Isn't this an indication that .the constant use of them is
worse than the habitual use of alcohol? If so, the excessive use of
drugs should be a ground for divorce under the habitual drunkenness provision. The courts have often stated that the purpose of
allowing divorces for habitual drunkenness is not to reform or to
promote temperance, but to preserve the peace, comfort, safety, happiness and prosperity of the home.1 06 Would not the awarding of
a divorce for the habitual use of drugs be just as noteworthy for this
purpose as habitual drunkenness caused by over indulgence in the
use of alcohol?
There have been several cases where the defendants were habitual
drunkards when they married the petitioners. In these cases no
divorces have been given because the courts felt that the petitioners
10 7
assumed the risk of such misconduct.
SEMJION 3. Plaintiff Must Reside in State 1 Year. - In order
to institute an action for divorce from the bonds of matrimony,
the plaintiff must have resided in the State of South Carolina
at least one year prior to the commencement of the action.
Residence, as used in divorce laws, is uniformly interpreted to
mean -domicile, or, as it is sometimes called, legal residence. 10 8
The matrimonial relationship is a matter with which the state, as
well as the husband and wife, is vitally concerned because our society and its laws are built around family unity. Since divorce involves the termination of the bonds of matrimony, a positive law
of some state is necessary. The state which is most closely tied
with the husband and wife is the state of domicile. It is this state
that is intrinsically concerned and for this reason jurisdiction to award
a divorce in the United States is based on domicile. 10 9 A divorce
action is not an in personam proceeding instituted by the husband or
the wife, but it is a law operating upon the marital relationship, thus
making it an action in rem. The res is the marriage status.110 As
in all in rem actions the suit must be brought in the state where the
res is situated. With divorce proceedings this is the state of domicile. Thus a divorce by a state court is in reality nothing more than
the exercising of the power of the state to determine the civil status
of its citizens.
106. See Dennis v. Dennis, 68 Conn. 186, 36 Atl. 34 (1896).
107. E. g., McNabb v. McNabb, 182 Iowa 1143, 166 N. W. 457 (1918).
108. GooDRicH, CoNFLIcr or LAWS § 20 (3d ed. 1949).
109. Id. § 127.

110. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942);

WARREN, SCHOULER

DIvoRcn MANUAL § 10.
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The various divorce acts in the United States only grant courts
the power to award a divorce when one or both parties have been domiciled in the state for the prescribed statutory period of time. In
thirty-four, a one year residence is required; in nine, two years; in
two, three years; in one, six months; and in one, six weeks. No
period is specified in New York. Of these jurisdictions thirty-eight
states require that the plaintiff must have been the one residing in
the state for the stated time. In ten states the residence requirement is satisfied by either party residing in the state for the named
period.1 11 The most important question that arises in connection
with Section 3 is what constitutes domicile.
Domicile means living in a place with the intent of making it a
permanent home. It is to be distinguished from residence which denotes a temporary place of abode.' 1 2 Every person has a place of
domicile, but he can have only one at a given time. A domicile is
imposed on one at his birth by operation of law.11 He takes the
domicile of his father, and it changes with his father's until he arrives at legal age or is emancipated. Thereafter, domicile becomes a
matter of choice. Often times people die at an old age without ever
having established a domicile of choice. If this be true, they retained their domicile of origin throughout life because one maintains
his old domicile until a new one is acquired. 1 4 In order to maintain a domicile one does not have to actually reside in the state. He
can have several residences elsewhere and this absence will have no
effect. In South Carolina the Constitution of 1895 provides: "Temporary absence from the state shall not forfeit a residence once obtained.""15 This result is reached in other states even in the absence
of such a Constitutional provision.
A person can change his domicile of origin or one of choice if he
goes to another place and then decides to remain at the new location
permanently. Thus, there are two essentials for a change of domicile:
(1) physical presence in the new place plus (2) an intention to make
it a permanent home. 116 The motive for changing domicile is not
important."17 Therefore, a person can acquire one in a state solely
111. 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAmILy LAWS § 82.
112. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 17.
113.,Udny v. Udny, L. R. (Sc.) 446 (1869); RESTATmrNT, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 14(1) (1934).
114. Ayer v.Weeks,65 N. H. 248, 18 At. 1108 (1880) ; Littlefield v.Brooks,
50 Me.475 (1862).
115. S. C. CoNsTrr. Art. 1,§ 12 (1895).
116. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 26; WARREN, SCHOTrJLR DIVORCE
MANUAL § 27; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 15.
117. Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619 (1913); McConnell v. Kelly,
138 Mass. 372 (1885); RES'AT mENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 22.
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in order to obtain a divorce so long as the acquisition is in good faith.
It is usually held that the wife takes the domicile of the husband
at marriage.1 18 The right to determine domicile must be exercised
by one of the parties and this duty has been placed on the husband.
The husband makes this determination because of the common law
view of the oneness of the husband and wife. Blackstone said the
reason was because the wife's very being was considered suspended
during marriage, or at least in that of the husband." 9 After marriage the wife's domicile changes with any move made by the husband so long as no domestic friction arises. In such an instance it
is not necessary for the wife to be physically present in the state for
the acquisition. She acquires the new one by operation of law. In
most jurisdictions today a wife with a cause for divorce can acquire
a new domicile in a state apart from that of -her husband's. 12 0 This
privilege has been given a wife because otherwise she might never
be able to obtain a divorce. The husband could defeat an action by
merely moving from one state to another so as to defeat the residence
requirement or by moving to a state where the ground was not recoghized. There are some authorities that state that a wife should be
able to obtain a separate domicile even if she has no ground for a
divorce if she is living apart from her husband.' 2 ' This does not
appear to be a sound rule because it would seem to discourage family unity.
One other question might be raised in connection with Section 3
of the Act. Need the plaintiff have been a domiciliary of the state
for one year and in addition have actually resided, that is to say,
been physically present in the state for one year preceding the action? Probably this wasn't intended by the Legislature. It certainly is not spelled out in the Act. Therefore, physical presence probably isn't necessary, although an extended absence would be strong
evidence against one's being domiciled in the state.
SECTION 4. Place of Trial. - Actions for divorce from the
bonds of matrimony shall be tried in the county in which the
defendant resides at the time of the commencement of the ac118. Parrett v. Palmer, 8 Ind. App. 356, 35 N. E. 713 (1893) ; Hackettstown
Bank v. Mitchell, 28 N. J. L. 516 (1860); RESTATEm NT, CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 27.

119. 1 BL. Comm. *442.
120. Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108 (U. S. 1869); Dunn v. Dunn, 59 Kan.
773, 52 Pac. 69 (1898) ; WARREN, SCHOULER DIVo RCE MANUAL § 32; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT or LAWS § 28.

121. Commonwealth v. Rutherfoord, 160 Va. 524, 169 S. E. 909 (1933)

ing case on this point).
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tion. or in the county where the plaintiff resides if the defendant
is a non-resident or after due diligence cannot be found, or in
the county in which the parties last resided as husband and wife.
The question of venue in divorce suits has been handled in many
different ways in the United States. Considering minor variations
there are some seventeen different requirements among the states.
It is obviously impossible to reach many definite conclusions on the
matter of where the divorce suit is to be brought. Some fourteen
states require that the suit be brought in the county where the plaintiff resides, while in twelve jurisdictions it can be filed in the county
where either the plaintiff or the defendant resides. The matter of
venue is generally covered by a statutory provision and hence it is
necessary to consult the code of the state wherein the action is being brought.
Considerable difficulty has been encountered with the venue provision of our Divorce Act. The lawyers and judges have been unable
to agree on whether the last clause is a qualification of the part pertaining to non-resident defendants or whether it was the intent of
the Legislature to provide for suits in the county wherein the parties
last lived as husband and wife irrespective of whether the defendant
be a resident of the state. Since the last clause is set off by a comma
it appears to be an alternative venue because such punctuation marks
are frequently used to divide parts of sentences. Five states specifically authorize the bririging of the suit in the county where the parties had their last matrimonial domicile. This county actually is
the best one for the suit. The chances are that most of the witnesses
live in this county and are therefore easily accessible. It would be
unfair to require the suit to be brought in a county where the defendant might have recently established a residence because of the
difficulty of getting the witnesses in court and because of the possibility of prejudice.
Therefore, it is believed by the writer to be an alternative choice
rather than a qualification, because of the punctuation, and the desirability of bringing the suit at the place of the last matrimonial
domicile.
This same issue was before the South Carolina Supreme Court in
the recent case of Thomas v. Thomas. 2. It appears that the plaintiff and defendant last resided together as husband and wife in Richland County. Prior to the commencement of the action the defendant
acquired a residence in Chesterfield County and was residing there
122. 62 S. E. 2d 307 (S. C. 1950).
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at the time of the commencement of the suit. Subsequently the defendant filed an unqualified answer to the complaint. A motion by
the defendant for a change of venue was refused by the Circuit
Judge because of his construction of Section 4 of the Statute. On
appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Circuit Judge
but did so on the basis that the defendant waived jurisdiction when
he answered the complaint without reserving the right to move for
a change of venue. The Court did not rule on the interpretation to
be given the section under consideration. However, in a concurring
opinion Justice Oxner had the following to say:
Under the general venue statute, Section 422 of the 1942 Code,
any action other than those specified in the preceding sections
must be tried in the county in which the defendant resides at
the time of the commencement of the action or if the defendant
is a non-resident, the action may be tried in any county which
the plaintiff shall designate in his complaint. There would have
been no purpose in the insertion of Section 4 of the divorce statute, 46 St. at L. 216, unless the Legislature intended to make
special provisions in actions for divorce. The statutes of a
number of states allow such an action to be brought in the county in which the parties last resided together as husband and
wife. This is a reasonable provision. The witnesses to any
divorce controversy would ordinarily reside where the parties
last lived together. Where one spouse deserts the other or
does some other act warranting a divorce and leaves the county of the marriage domicile, it might be essentially unfair to
force the innocent party to sue for divorce in the county where
the guilty party had recently acquired a residence.12
The judges in South Carolina are given the power to change the
venue where such a change would be convenient for the witnesses and
for the promotion of the ends of justice.'2 However, in view of the
use of the words "shall be tried" it seems that the Legislature intended that the suit had to be tried in one of the prescribed counties.
Since there is no limitation on changing venue, it would seem that
the judge can order such a change pursuant to his discretionary
power so long as the suit is actually tried in one of the counties provided for in the Act.
There are several decisions in the United States holding that in a
divorce action the question of venue can be waived by a failure to
123. Id. at 310.
124. S. C. CODE §§ 35, 420,426 (1942).
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plead it.12 5 These decisions are based on the premise that the statutory provisions relating to venue are merely for the benefit of the
parties and that any irregularity can be waived. On the other hand,
some courts have held that if a suit is instituted in the wrong county it will be dismissed even though the defendant consents to the
trial.126 Our Supreme Court has had one occasion to apply estoppel
or waiver in such an instance. Query: Would the same result be
reached if the suit were originally brought in a county which had
no relationship to the parties and which was not the last matrimonial
domicile? Would not the words "shall be tried" require suit in one
of the counties listed in Section 4 irrespective of a waiver by the
defendant?
SECTION 5. Service of Summons on Non-resident.-Where the
person on whom the service of the summons in an action for
divorce from the bonds of matrimony is to be made cannot,
after due diligence, be found within the State, and the fact appears to the satisfaction of the court, or judge thereof, the clerk
of the court, of common pleas, master, or the probate judge
of the county in which the cause is pending, and it in like manner appears that a cause of action exists against the defendant in respect to whom the service is to be made, such court,
judge, clerk, master or judge of probate, may grant an order
that the service be made by the publication of the summons in
the manner and with the effect provided for in sub-section (1)
of Section 436 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1942.
In lieu of publication of summons as provided in paragraph 1,
Section 436, Code of 1942, plaintiff may cause such process to
be served personally upon any non-resident and the service so
made shall be sufficient.
Ordinarily in civil suits in South Carolina the summons must be
served on the defendant personally, or on some person of discretion
residing at the residence, or employed at the place of business of said
defendant. 12 7 Since a divorce action is a civil proceeding it follows
that whenever possible the service must be had on the defendant
in the state. In divorce cases the defendant has often times established a residence in another state, concealed himself within the state
or else he has merely left the state without having established a new
125. Gallagher v. Gallagher, 214 S. W. 516 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919); Watts v.
Watts, 130 Ga. 683, 61 S. E. 593 (1908).
126. Haygood v. Haygood, 190 Ga. 445, 9 S. E. 2d 834 (1940) ; Annotation,
130 A. L. R. 95.
127. S. C. CoDn § 434 (1942).
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residence. In these instances it is not possible to meet the requirements of § 434. Recognizing this difficulty, the Legislature has
made provision for substituted service where necessary. Section 5 is
thus placed in the Act to take care of the situations where the defendant cannot be personally served within the state. It should be
noted that there must be a due diligent search for the defendant,
and the proof of such a search must be to the satisfaction of either
the court, judge, clerk, master or probate judge of the county in
which the cause is pending trial.
As was pointed out in connection with Section 3 of the Act, a divorce action is not a personal judgment by one against another, but
rather one similar to an in rem proceeding. Thus, the court is concerned with a res which is within its jurisdiction. This being true
it is not necessary to have personal service of process on the defendant within the jurisdiction. Where the court has jurisdiction
over the res it is only necessary to give the defendant notice in order
that he may reasonably have the opportunity to be heard. This right
is granted by the Federal Constitution.1 28 This is why constructive
service of process by way of publication is sufficient where the defendant cannot be personally served in the state. It has been held
that the notice required by our Constitution must be "of such a
character that it will have a tendency, in a reasonable degree, to
convey information to interested parties that the action affects their
rights."'1 9 Of course if the defendant is personally served with the
process in a divorce action, even though it is out of the state, the
requirements of the 14th Amendment are met. Hence, the provision allowing service out of the state which appears in Section 5 is
constitutional.
The statutory notice which is usually given pursuant to Sections 5
of the Act and 436(1) of the Code is:
SUMMONS

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, COUNTY OF ...................
in the -------------------------------------------Court.
Mary Smith, Plaintiff,
v.
John Smith, Defendant.
To the Defendant above named:
You are hereby summoned and required to answer the com128. U. S. CoNs. AMXND. XIV.
129. See Fenton v. Minnesota Title Ins. & Trust Co., 15 N. D. 365, 372, 109
CoNFLicT OF LAWS § 69.

N. W. 363, 366 (1906) ; GooDracH,
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plaint herein, a copy of which has been filed in the Office of the
Clerk of ......................................................
County, and to serve
a copy of your answer to said complaint upon the subscriber,
Jack Johnson, No. 210 Lawyers Building ...........................
S. C.,
within twenty (20) days after service hereof, exclusive of the
date. of such service and if you fail to answer the complaint within the time aforesaid plaintiff will apply to the Court for the relief demanded in the complaint.
Jack Johnson,
Attorney for Plaintiff.

........................................
S.C .
1951
To the Defendant Above Named:
Take notice that the summons in the above entitled action, of
which the foregoing is a copy, together with the complaint therein, was filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court for .................
County on the ............
day of ...................................
, 1951, the object and prayer of which is to obtain a decree of divorce, a
vinculo "tatrimonii, and certain other relief on the grounds of
....

........................................................................

o

Jack Johnson,
Attorney for Plaintiff.

.....................................
S.C .
1951

SECTION 6. Must Attempt to Reconcile Parties-ReferenceDecree. - In all cases referred to a Master or Special Referee,
such Master, or Special Referee, shall summon the party or
parties within the jurisdiction of the court before him, and it
shall be the duty of such officer to make an earnest effort to
bring about a reconciliation between the parties to such cause,
if the parties appear before the Master or Special Referee, Provided, however, that in default cases the Master or Special Referee shall not be required to summon the party before him, but
at the time of reference shall effect a reconciliation if possible.
No judgment of divorce shall be granted in such case unless
the Master, or Special Referee to whom such cause may be referred, shall certify in his report, or if said cause has not been
referred then the trial judge shall state in the Decree in said
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cause, that he has attempted to reconcile the parties to such action, and that such efforts were unavailing. No reference shall
be had before two months after the filing of the complaint in
the office of the Clerk of Court, nor shall a final decree be granted before three months after such filing.' 30
Various tactics are used in the United States as last efforts to
prevent divorce. As has been previously pointed out a state is interested in preserving the marital status of its citizens because our
society is formed around the family. In order to save the marriage
some states have "cooling off" periods such as the one mentioned
in the latter part of Section 6 of our Act. Other states grant interlocutory decrees which do not become final until the expiration of
a given period of time. And some states have enacted a system of
compulsory counseling as a means of reconciling the parties. Criticisms, both favorable and unfavorable, can be lodged against these
various attempts to prevent the dissolution of the marriage. Section 6 is really a .combination of all of these things. For those
who believe in maintaining the marriage status, if at all possible,
it must be admitted that the efforts towards reconciliation required
of the Master, Special Referee or Judge are worthy of praise. Many
marriages can be saved through such attempts. As evidence of this
note the following incident. 13
Judge Thomas J. Cunningham of
the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California, has stated
that in January 1949 he-began the practice of asking, before calling
his calendar, if there were any parties in the court room or any attorneys who felt that a reconciliation might be effected. As a result of this practice there were 175 .requests in 26 court days for cases
to be heard in chambers on reconciliation. Out of these 175 cases
came 59 complete reconciliations, 35 temporary continuances so that
the parties could-have another try, and 80 failures. In none of these
cases had there been voluntary petitions for reconciliation filed.
This experience shows conclusively that many divorces can be
prevented by cool, deliberate and persuasive efforts on the part
of some able person. Unfortunately very few dissolutions have been
prevented under Section 6. On the basis of a check made by this
writer there appear to have been reconciliations in only approximately
2.5% of the cases filed.' The reason for this low percentage might
be attributed to two things. First, the proper officials may not be
making bona fide efforts to reunite the parties. It could be that
only one side of the story is being heard, or if both sides are heard,
130. As amended by 46 S. C. ST.A.T. AT LARGE 2363 (1950).
131. 2 VIRGINIA LAw WEEKLY DIcT. 47.
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too much weight is given to one of them. Let us hope that the
failure of the proper officials to perform their statutory duty is not
the cause for our poor results along these lines. Secondly, it might
be suggested that most of our divorce cases have involved parties
who completely abandoned each other for some reason some time
ago, and thus the opportunities for reconciliation are not as great
as they would be where the ground alleged occurred in the immediate past. Undoubtedly we have had many people who wanted divorces, but who could not get them due to the lack of a divorce law.
For this reason the ground for divorce might have occurred many
years ago and as a result the parties have been hopelessly split. After
these cases have been cleared up maybe we will begin to see more
parties reconciled by the relentless efforts of our court officials. Let
us hope so.
Over and above the requirements of Section 6 it should be borne
in mind that the first duty a lawyer owes to his client in a divorce case is that of reconciliation. The lawyer should not feel that
such efforts might result in losing fees. Even if they are, they are
well lost in the cause of justice and truth. However, such fees need
not be lost. A lawyer who has prevented a divorce has rendered
his client a far greater service than he would have by obtaining it.
Therefore, he should not hesitate to ask for compensation for the
services rendered. A lawyer can do more towards saving the marriage than any other person because he is in a closer relationship with
his client. He should bear in mind, though, that he is not always
advising a client in his normal mind, but rather one whose blood is
often charged with anger, jealousy, hurt pride, hatred and malice.
Thus, what is said should be done in an atmosphere of cool comprehension.
In addition to the efforts for reconciliation, the Legislature has
provided for a "cooling off" period by specifying that no reference
shall be had until two months after the filing of the complaint, and
by further providing that no final decree shall be granted sooner than
three months after the filing. These provisions should also prevent
many divorces. Time cures many evils. Therefore, if the parties
are given the opportunity to cool off and contemplate what they have
done, they frequently decide that the steps taken have been too
drastic.
SECTION 7. Judgment Not Render Illegitimate Children Begotten of the Marriage.-No judgment of divorce from the bonds
of matrimony shall render illegitimate the children begotten of
the marriage.
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An annulment of a marriage has the effect of declaring that the
marriage was null and void ab initio.182 Since this is true, the children begotten during such a marriage are illegitimate because they
are borne out of wedlock,'8 8 unless there be statutory authority declaring them legitimate. On the other hand, an absolute divorce
does not render the marriage void from its inception, but instead
dissolves the marriage contract as of the date of the divorce decree.
For this reason the decree itself does not affect the legitamacy of
children born or begotten during the marriage. 134 This is the
universal rule followed even in the absence of statutory authority.
However, the Legislature has seen fit to incorporate this rule into
the South Carolina Act. It was apparently done to assure the protection of the children of divorcees.
SECTION 8. Alimony - Suit Money. - In every action for divorce from the bonds of matrimony, the wife, whether she be
plaintiff or defendant, may in her complaint or answer or by
petition pray for the allowance to her of alimony and suit money,
and for the allowance of such alimony and suit money pendente
lite and, if such claim shall appear well founded, the court shall
allow a reasonable sum therefor.
At common law the husband became entitled upon marriage to absolute ownership of his wife's chattels. Moreover, he had the right
to collect her choses in action and earnings as well as the sole right
to use her lands during coverture.1 35 As a result of these rights
vesting in the husband, the wife became penniless and there was
certainly a practical and not just a fictitious economic disappearance
of the woman in the eyes of the law whenever she was married.
As has previously been pointed out, no absolute divorces were awarded in England for many years with the exception of those few given
by way of Special Acts of Parliament. The only divorce granted
was the decree a mensa et thoro, which was not actually a divorce,
but a mere legal separation. A decree a mensa et thoro in no way
affected the rights that the husband obtained in his wife's property
at marriage.13 6 Only death or an absolute divorce could revert title
to property in the wife. This being true a wife had no property
or means of support when the parties were legally authorized to live
132. 2 BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

133. Ibid.

§ 690.

134. W.AREN, ScnourLER DIVoRcE MANUAL § 201; 2 VERNIER, AmERIcAN
FAmLY LAws § 94.
135. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS §§ 28-33; Prince v. Prince,
1 Rich. Eq. 282 (S. C. 1845).

136. 2 BIsHoP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORcE
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apart from each other. In order to keep the wife from remaining
in this destitute state, the ecclesiastical courts upon granting a limited
divorce would order the husband to provide a certain amount of money
for his wife's maintenance. 137 This maintenance was not given to
the wife in order to penalize the husband, but rather because of
necessity due to the wife's economic position. The term which the
courts gave this nourishment or sustenance that the husband was
required to furnish his wife who was living apart from him was
alimony.' 38 The word alimony is derived from the word alimentum
of the Civil Law and literally means nourishment or sustenance.
This alimony which the husband paid to his wife was in reality a
substitute for the legal duty which the husband had to support his
wife. 139 The amount which was decreed to be paid varied according to the circumstances of the case. Generally though the provision amounted to about 1/3 of the husband's income. 140 With this
background we can define the alimony awarded by the ecclesiastical
courts as the allowance which a husband, by order of court, paid
his wife for her support while living separate from her.
That which was granted the wife by the final decree allowing the
parties to live apart from each other was referred to as permanent
alimony because it was provided for in the final decree.
In the United States an award similar to the provision established by the ecclesiastical courts is made to the wife where there
is an absolute divorce, as well as in connection with legal separations
or limited divorces. These awards ire called alimony, but in theory
they are not alimony when given to the wife upon the dissolution of
the marriage. Where the marriage contract is dissolved there is no
longer any duty on the part of the man to support and maintain his
former wife. 14 1 This duty was removed when the marriage ended.
Therefore, we must arrive at a broader definition of alimony when
the award is made in conjunction with an absolute divorce. The
following would seem to fit the situation: Alimony is a judgment
for the loss which the wife sustains in losing her husband and his
support, and not a judicial determination of the husband's duty to
the wife. Though this definition appears adequate, it should be said
that one South Carolina Judge has stated that the amount of the
137. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIc RELATIONS § 97; Matheson v. McCormac, 186 S. C. 93, 195 S. R. 122 (1938).
138. See Matheson v. McCormac, 186 S. C. 93, 99, 195 S. E. 122, 125 (1938);
2 BIsHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 352.
139. Rollins v. Gould, 244 Mass. 270, 138 N. E. 815 (1923); Toncray v.
Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S. W. 497 (1910).
140. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 97.

141. 2 VERNIER, AMxRIcAN FAMILY LAWS § 104.
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alimony to be given the wife depends on the fault of the husband. 14 2
Similar statements have been found among the decisions of other
states. 143 Does this mean that alimony as we know it today is, in
addition to the above, a penalty being imposed on the husband because of a breach of the marriage contract? It would appear to be.
If alimony is a judgment for the loss of the husband and his support, isn't the loss just as great in the case where the husband is faultless as in the instance where he is primarily to blame?
Alimony is not an estate which is granted the wife, nor is it a
portion of the husband's estate which is assigned to the wife as her
own; but it is merely an allowance out of the husband's estate for
the nourishment of his wife.1 44 The only time that alimony approaches the status of an estate or portion which is carved out of
the husband's property is when the husband cannot be served with
process in the jurisdiction because of a residence elsewhere, or when
he has absconded and cannot be given notice of the pendency of the
suit.145 Here the suit is in the nature of a proceeding in rem in that
the husband's property is proceeded against.
How much of an allowance is the wife entitled to get where there
is a permanent alimony award? The courts have wisely never adopted any definite rules by which to determine the amount of alimony.
They usually state that the amount depends on the wife's needs,
as determined by her station in life, and the estate of the husband
and his ability to earn. 148 The awards vary from 1/3 to 1/2 of the
husband's estate.1 47 Some states have prescribed the proportion to
be given by statute.1 48 Beyond these rules the courts state that each
case must be decided on its own circumstances by the trial judge exercising a wise and just discretion. This discretion refers to judicial
rather than an arbitrary discretion. 149 Over and above the previously mentioned tests the courts consider the following factors in arriving at the amount of the allowance granted to the wife: fault of the
respective parties,' 5 0 the wife's contribution to the husband's pro142. See Thompson v. Thompson, 10 Rich. Eq. 416, 424 (S. C. 1859).
143. uluir v. Muir, 133 Ky. 125, 95 S. W. 314 (
); Pinion v. Pinion, 92
Utah 255, 67 P. 2d 265 (1937). Cf. Loth v. Loth, 227 Minn. 387, 35 N. W.
2d 542 (

).

144. Matheson v. McCormac, 186 S. C. 93, 195 S. E. 122 (1938).
145. Ibid.
146. WARREN, ScHOULER DIVoRcE MANUAL § 258; MADDEN, PERSONs
DomesTic RELATIONS § 97-.
147. WARREN, SCHOULER DIVORCE MANUAL § 262.
148. 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 107;

AND

Ibid.

149. Hornsby v. Hornsby, 187 S. C. 463, 198 S. E. 29 (1938).
150. Thompson v. Thompson, 10 Rich. Eq. 416 (S. C. 1859) ; Lewis v. Lewis,
202 Ark. 740, 151 S. W. 2d 998 (1941) ; Bielan v. Bielan, 135 Conn. 163, 62 A.

2d 664 (1948); 2 BISHOP, MARRIAGE

AND DIVoRcE §
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perty, 151 age of the parties,' 5 2 health of the husband and wife,' 58 the
wife's earning capacity,lM husband's debts, i5 5 property owned by
the wife, 156 duration of the marriage, and the religion of the parties.
From this it can be seen that the courts will not allow a husband to
support himself in luxury and his wife in squalor. 15 7 Since alimony
was originally granted to the wife as a form of nourishment or sustenance, there are cases to be found indicating that a wife with property or income of her own should not be entitled to permanent alimony because she is able to support herself.1 58 Such statements as
these would appear to be accurate if alimony were still as restricted
in its scope as it was in early England. It is not so confined today
and if the wife is to get it as an offset for the loss of her husband and
his support, her financial worth should not ipso facto deprive her of
the award, although the court should consider this fact in arriving
at the amount she is to obtain from her husband.
In the discussion of Section 3, supra, it was pointed out that divorce actions are proceedings in rem and do not require personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. This is not the case with alimony
requests. An alimony award is a proceeding that requires personal
jurisdiction over the defendant because the action is in personam.,5 9
Therefore, some basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendant
must be established in order for the court to be able to decree the
payment of such a provision. In many instances it is impossible to
find a basis for personal jurisdiction and yet some method should be
prescribed so as to permit the allocation. The courts have made an
exception to the general rule requiring jurisdiction over the person
to cover such hardship cases. If jurisdiction cannot be had of the
defendant and if the defendant has property which is situated in the
state, such property can be appropriated by the court and decreed
to the wife in satisfaction of her alimony claim.' 6 0 Such an action
151. Burns v. Burns, 173 Ky. 105, 190 S. W. 683 (1917) ; Skinner v. Skinner,
47 Ind. App. 670, 95 N. E. 128 (1911) ; 2 BisHoP, MARIuAGr AND DiVORCS § 457.
152. Lovett v. Lovett, 11 Ala. 763 (1847) ; 2 BisHoP, MARmIAGX AND DivoacE
0 457.
153. 2 BISHOP, MAIRIAGE AND DIvoRcE § 457.
154. Ibid.
155. Cf. Thomas v. Thomas, 182 S. C. 16, 188 S. E. 367 (1937).
156. Huff v. Huff, 73 W. Va. 330, 80 S. E. 846 (1913) ; Romaine v. Chauncey, 129 N. Y. 566, 29 N. E. 826 (1892); MADDEN, PmsoNs AND Do sTIc
RnLAxroNs § 97.
157. See Matheson v. McCormac, 186 S. C. 93, 99, 195 S. . 122, 125 (1938).
158. Roberts v. Roberts, 160 Md. 513, 154 AUt. 95 (1931); Wilkins v. Wilkins,

84 Neb. 206, 120 N: W. 907 (1909) ; Huff v. Huff, 73 W. Va. 330, 80 S. R. 846
(1913) ; Cf. Ring v. Ring, 185 Va. 269, 38 S. E. 2d 471 (1946).

159. Matheson v. McCormac, 186 S. C. 93, 195 S. R. 122 (1938); GooDnucn,

CoNFiarc ov LAws §

160. Ibid.

138.
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is in the nature of a proceeding in ren under the now famous doc16 1
trine of Pennoyer v. Neff.
Since alimony is awarded in conjunction with a decree dissolving
the marriage, the interesting question arises as to whether there can
be a decree for such an allotment in a subesquent action where there
was no provision for it in the divorce decree itself. The question
of alimony being an issue which could have been litigated in the original action, the decree renders the question res ajudicata, and thus
a subsequent request is usually denied even though it was sought but
not granted, or even where no request was made ;162 unless there is
a reason for the failure to make the award such as gross negligence
on the part of counsel. Some states now have statutes which permit
and award after the final decree. 163 But even in the absence of such
a statute there are two recognized exceptions to the general rule.
They relate to the situation where there is an ex parte decree. Frequently, where the wife brings suit it is impossible to obtain jurisdiction over the husband and in such a case the husband often times does
not have property in the state which can be proceeded against.'6 At
other times the husband goes to a foreign state and there seeks a
divorce, serving the wife by way of constructive service. 165 In these
instances the right to alimony was not and could not have been ajudicated and can thus be litigated in a subsequent suit. There is authority to the contrary, however, where the wife proceeds in a court which
does not have jurisdiction over the husband.166 These authorities
hold that the wife surrendered her right to alimony by having elected
to obtain a decree of divorce from a court having no jurisdiction over
the husband. The writer does not favor this view because it means
that a wife would have to forget the divorce, or take it without any
support thereafter from her husband. This is a difficult decision for
'a wife to make when her husband has absconded to another state
without leaving property behind.
161. 95 U. S. 714 (1877).
162. Schnerr v. Schnerr, 128 Cal. App. 363, 17 P. 2d 749 (1932); Astall v.

Astall, 283 S. W. 564 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Nelson v. Nelson, 146 Ark. 362,
225 S. W. 619 (1920); WAIERN, SCHOUTLR DIVoRcE MANUAL § 256.
163. MAss. G=.. LAWS c. 208, § 34 (1932); Nxw JtasEy Rr.v. STAT. §2:5037 (1937); R. I. Gsi. LAws § 4216 (1923).
164. Wagster v. Wagster, 193 Ark. 902, 103 S. W. 2d 638 (1937); West v.
West, 114 Okla. 279, 246 Pac. 599 (1926) ; Weidman v. Weidman, 57 Ohio St.
101, 48 N. E. 506 (1897); WoazRi-, Scnouzxa DivoRc MANuAL § 256.
165. Honaker v. Honaker, 218 Ky. 212, 291 S. W. 42 (1927); Toncray v.
Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S. W. 977 (1910); Cochran v. Cochran, 42 Neb.
612, 60 N. W. 942 (1894).
166. Staub v. Staub 170 Md. 202, 183 At. 605 (1936); Kelley v. Kelley, 317
Ill. 104, 147 N. E. 6 59 (1925); McCoy v. McCoy, 191 Iowa 973, 183 N. W.
377 (1921).
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A decree for alimony can be enforced in several different ways.
One of the most common methods used is imprisonment for contempt
of court for failure to pay pursuant to the court order.16 7 Such imprisonment is not a violation of a constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debt since the confinement is made because of the
husband's failure to abide by the court order, unless there is a statute
to the contrary. The husband would be excused from paying, of
course, if he had no property and had earned no income out of which
to satisfy the claim. However, a present inability to pay is no defense for a previous failure to meet the obligation when the husband
had the financial means. Imposing a fine on the husband is another
68
way to insure the payment of the provision made for the wife.'
This method would not be appropriate if the husband did not have
any property. Attachment of property belonging to the husband or
of funds due him by third persons, commonly called garnishment
elsewhere, can be employed by the wife to satisfy the husband's obligation.' 6 9 Also the court can require the husband to furnish security at the time that the decree is rendered. This authority is specifically conferred on the South Carolina Courts in Section 9 of the Act.
In line with this it would seem that the court, in accordance with its inherent power, could declare the decree for alimony a lien upon the
real property of the husband. This power has been generally exercised by the courts in other states in the absence of statutory warrant. In many states an action at law can be brought on the alimony
decree and the judgment can then be enforced in the same manner
as other law judgments. 17 0 Such a remedy is not available where
the decree is subject to modification as in South Carolina. 17 1 Where
the court has the power to modify the alimony provision there is no
final judgment and this is the reason no action at law can be brought
thereon.
What is the duration of alimony? Since it is awarded by the
court in its discretion, the court can determine the time for which
the payments will continue. Therefore, one way in which alimony
payments can be terminated is by court order. Also they are ipso
167. Adams v. Adams, 80 N. J. Eq. 175, 83 AtI. 190 (1912); 2 BISHOP,
§ 498; Hornsby v. Hornsby, 187 S. C. 463, 198 S. E. 29

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

(1938).
168. Mayer v. Mayer, 154 Mich. 386, 117 N. W. 890 (1908): Welty v. Welty,
195 Ill. 335. 63 N. E. 161 (1902); Ramsay v. Ramsay, 125 Miss. 185, 87

So. 491 (1921).

169. 2

VERNIER, AMERICAN FAnlIY LAWS § 108.

170. 2 BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 499.
171. Toth v. Toth, 242 Mich. 23, 217 N. W. 913 (1928) ; Dickey v. Dickey,
154 Md. 675, 141 Atl. 387 (1928).
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facto put to an end whenever one of the parties dies. 172 If it is the
husband, his obligation passed upon his death; if the wife, then there
is no longer one whom the husband must support. Alimony is payable only during the joint lives of the parties, unless there is a statute or a provision by the husband to the contrary. Since alimony
is historically and basically a substitute for the husband's duty to
support, the duty to pay alimony ceases where the wife is imprisoned
or confined to a state institution.1 73 The wife has no needs where
there is such a confinement because her requirements are furnished
by the state, and therefore the husband's obligation is terminated for
this period. In South Carolina allotments for the wife are terminated
whenever the wife remarries. This stipulation is found in Section
9, infra. However, the remarriage of the wife does not put an end
to the allocations made for children who are in the custody of the wife.
While on the subject of the duration of alimony one more point
might be made. Suppose that a husband and wife are living apart
from each other and the husband is paying alimony pursuant to a
court decree, what effect does an absolute divorce have on the prior
award? The husband's obligation to pay where there is a legal sepaTherefore, any proviration is terminated by absolute divorce. 174
sion made by a court in an absolute divorce decree would supersede
the old allotment. And if there is no award to the wife at the time
of the divorce she is not entitled to any further payments after the
marriage is dissolved.
A debt for "alimony due or to become due, or for maintenance or
support of wife or child" is not affected by a discharge in bankruptcy. 175 Moreover, the courts generally hold that alimony which
is to be paid in installments in the future is not susceptible of assignment by the wife to another.' 76 However, past due sums or install17
ments are usually recognized as assignable. 6a
Because alimony is historically a substitute for the husband's duty
to support the wife, a husband is not entitled to alimony. At common law the wife had no duty to support the husband. Therefore,
172. WARREN, SCHOULER DIVORCE MANUAL § 280; MADDEN,
DOMESTIC RELATIONS §§ 97, 98.
173. Cf. Leslie v. Leslie, [1908], Prob. 99, 13 Ann. Cos. 750.
174. WARREN, SCHOULER DIVORCE MANUAL § 281.

PERSONS AND

175: FEDERAL'BANKRUPTCY ACT § 17(2), 11 U. S. C. A. § 35(2). See In re
Ridder, 79 F. 2d 524 (1935) ; Heimberger v. Joseph. 53 F. 2d 171 (1931).
176. O'Harayv. O'Hara, 137 N. J. Eq. 369. 44 A. 2d 169 (1945) ; Fournier v.
Clutton, 146 'Mich. 298, 109 N. W. 425 (1906). There is a split of authority
on the assignability of an allowance in gross. See cases in Annotation, 97 A.
L. R. 211.

176a. Cederberg v. Gunstrom, 193 Minn. 421, 258 N. W. 574 (1935) ; Annotation, 97 A. L. R. 212.
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-unless there be a statutory grant, the husband is not entitled to an
award of alimony. 177 No such sanction has been given by the South
Carolina Legislature.
Temporary alimony and suit money. The ecclesiastical courts gave
a wife an award for her maintenance during the pendency of the
suit. 178 This provision for the wife's support was called alimony
pendente lite or alimony ad interium. As was true with permanent
alimony, alimony pendente lite was given the wife because of necessity and not as a form of punishment against the husband. 179 The
allowance was a temporary or mere provisional remedy. This view
was followed in the American courts until the adoption of the married women's property acts.180 Since that time our courts have allowed such temporary allotments only when the wife does not have
the means to support herself.' 8 1 When allowed it is because alimony
pcndente lite is the enforcement of the duty to support while permanent alimony is a substitute for the duty. It is not necessary for the
wife to establish the merits of her suit or defense in order for her
to get temporary alimony.182 However, she must show a prima
fade case or defense.' 83 The award is made on the basis of the
wife's necessities and her income and the husband's earnings. If the
wife has sufficient means with which to maintain herself during the
time that the suit is pending, then she is not entitled to temporary
alimony. Yet if she has some income, but not enough for her requ~irements, the court will order the husband to pay an amount which
will provide those things which the wife cannot obtain from her income. The courts are more inclined to grant temporary alimony than
1 4
permanent, but do not show as much liberality in fixing the amount. 8
Suit money was allowed the wife in the ecclesiastical courts on the
came basis as temporary alimony. This is likewise done today.' 8 5

177. 2 VERmIR, AmEEICAN
178. Id. § 110.
179. MADDEN, PERoSNs
180. Ibid.

AND

FAMILY LAWS

§ 109.

Doutsnc REATiOxs § 98.

181. Jeffords v. Jeffords, 216 S. C. 451, 58 S. E. 2d 731 (1950); Armstrong

v. Armstrong, 185 S. C. 518, 194 S. E. 640 (1938).
182. Hornsby v. Hornsby, 187 S. C. 463, 198 S. E. 29 (1938).
183. Jeffords v. Jeffords, 216 S. C. 451, 58 S. E. 2d 731 (1950); Hornsby v.
Hornsby, 187 S. C. 463, 198 S. E. 29 (1938); 2 VERNiER, AmERicAN FAmIry
LAWS § 110.

184. 2 VERNIER,

AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 110.
185. MADDEN, PERsoNs AND Doizsnc PELA7ioNs § 98.
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SECTION 9. Judgment in Action by Wife May Provide for
Maintenance, Alimony and Suit Money of Wife- Payment of
Permanent Alimony - Support of Children - Remarriage by
Wife Cancel Alimony.-In every judgment of divorce from the
bonds of matrimony in suit by the wife, the court shall make such
orders touching the maintenance, alimony and suit money of the
wife, or any allowance to be made to her, and, if any, the security
to be given for the same, as from the circumstances of the parties
and nature of the case may be fit, equitable and just; but no alimony shall be granted to an adulterous wife. In any award of
permanent alimony, the court shall have jurisdiction to order
periodic payments or payment in a lump sum; PROVIDED,
that in any award for permanent alimony and support, in the
event the Court shall award the custody of the children to the
wife, the court shall in its decree allocate the same between the
children and the wife, and in the event of the remarriage of the
wife the amount fixed in such decree for the support of such
wife shall forthwith cease and no further payments shall be required from such divorced husband.
In the ecclesiastical courts in England there was no alimony given
to a guilty wife.18 6 Apparently this refusal was based on the old
maxim that a person seeking relief bad to come into the court with
clean hands or else aid would not be given. This premise has generally been followed in the United States. 187 However, some seven
jurisdictions now have statutes which allow alimony for a wife guilty
of misconduct.' 88 Two states, other than South Carolina, expressly
forbid an allowance to an adulterous wife. Is this a change in the old
rule or does the Legislature mean that a wife shall be entitled to alimony except when she be an adulteress? The latter possibility is the
better interpretation. Seldom is only one of the parties at fault in
a divorce action. One is usually as guilty as the other. Moreover,
a guilty wife must eat just as an innocent one. If alimony is not
provided the chances are greater that these women are going to starve
or become charges of the state. The misconduct of the wife should
not be a bar to alimony, but it should properly be considered in determining the amount to be decreed. But even in this connection the
wife's needs and the husband's ability should receive primary consideration in fixing the amount of the provision.
186. JAcoBs, CAsEs AND MA'nz.uAJs ON Domsnc RmATioNs 793; 2 VERnm,
AmmiucA1 FAMILY LAWs § 105.
187. MADDEN, PiRSONS AND DOMESTIC RLATIONS § 97.
188. 2 VuImR, AmEcCAN FAmILY LAWS § 105.
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Periodic Payments. Alimony, as it was originally develop'ed, was
an allowance which the court gave the wife after a divorce a mensa
et thoro for her support and maintenance. Accordingly it was always
given in the form of continuous payments of money at-regular intervals. 189 This mode of payment was prescribed in lieu of a lump sum
or alimony in gross because the husband was only liable for his wife's
sustenance and nourishment as these needs arose. The English rule
has generally prevailed in the United States, 19 0 although it has been
changed by statute in many states as in South Carolina.' 9 ' But even
in the absence of legislative authority to grant alimony, in gross,
some courts have done it where there is an exceptional case presented
or where the parties consent. 19 2 Probably because of historical reasons and the old legal theory of the incapacity of women, courts hesitate to grant alimony in a lump sum. With these historical reasons
removed it is difficult to understand why a court should favor one
form more than another today. The very connotation of alimony
has changed because it now means more than just maintenance and
support, and also women have been almost completely emancipated.
Why should an intelligent woman be bound to a meager life or long
struggle because of the form.of alimony awarded her? If she were
given enough with which to start a business enterprise she could
be more helpful to herself and the community. Of course there are
many instances where women would squander a lump sum and thereafter be without support and they would become destitute. This
writer thinks that it would be desirable for the court to have an open
mind about the mode of payment and for it to prescribe payment in
the manner called for in each case. Certainly an inflexible rule on
the form the alimony is to take would be unwise.
As is true with every other legal problem today, some thought must
be given to federal taxation. Therefore, the writer urges that the
current tax provisions be studied before deciding upon the form of
alimony to be recommended to a client.' 9 3

189. 2 Bisnop,

MARRIAGS AND DIVORCM

§ 427; 2 VERNIE, AmIrRICA-

FAMILY

LAWS § 107.

190. Heckes v. Heckes, 129 Fla. 653, 176 So. 541 (1937); Roberts v. Roberts, 160 Md. 513, 154 At. 95 (1931); MADMND,PERSONS AND DoMESTIC R LATIONS § 98.
191. 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 107.
192. Matheson v. McCormac, 186 S. C. 93, 195 S. E. 122 (1938); WARREN,
SCHOULER DIVORCE MANUAL § 257.

193. I. R. C. § 22(k).
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SECTION 10. Care, Custody and Maintenance of Children.In any action for divorce from the bonds of matrimony, the court
shall have power at any stage of the cause, or from time to time
after final judgment, to make such orders touching the care, custody and maintenance of the children of the marriage; and what,
if any, security shall be given for the same. as from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case and the best
spiritual as well as other interests of the children may be fit,
equitable and just.
By the common law in England a father had the paramount right
to the control and custody of his minor children. 194 As a matter of
fact this right was almost absolute and there were, as can be imagined, many instances where hardships were rendered because of
the forcefulness of this rule. The rule had as its basis the fact that
custody and support are almost inseparable. 195 Therefore, since the
wife was deprived of her property during marriage there was nothing
for the court to do but grant to the husband the control of his children. This hardship was subsequently changed in England by statutory provisions. 19 6 The English view never gained a foothold in
the United States. 197 The courts in this country have always primarily considered the welfare of the child, irrespective of the common law views. 198 All jurisdictions now have statutes on the custody
and support of children. 199 Generally they are similar to Section 10.
In making an award of the children the court makes ,an order that
provides for the best interests of the children, irrespective of the
gratification of the parents.2 0 0 The power is discretionary with the
court.20 1 Certainly Section 10 gives the court the power to determine in its wise discretion what provisions should be made for the
care of the children, since there are no limitations placed on the
court's power. This section is an indication of serious thought on
the part of the Legislature, and it is submitted that it covers the
matter most adequately.

194. 2 VERNIER, AmERIcAN FAMILY
DOMESTIc RELATIONS § 107.

LAWS §

195;

MADDEN,

PERSONS AND

195. Ibid.; 2 BIsHoP, MARRIAE AND DivoRcE §§ 526, 528.
196. 2 and 3 Vict. c. 54 (1839) ; 49 and 50 Vict. c.27, § 5 (1886).
197.
198.
199.

MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIc RELATIONS §§ 107, 109.
WARREN, SCHOULER DIVORCE MANUAL § 296.
2 VERNIER, AMERIcAN FAMILY LAWS § 95.

200. Ibid.

201. Ibid.; WARREN,

ScHOULER DIvORcZ MANUAL § 295.
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SECTION 11. Change, Confirm or Terminate Alimony.-Whenever any husband, pursuant to a judgment of divorce from the
bonds of matrimony, has been required to make to his wife any
periodic payments of alimony, and the circumstances of the
parties or the financial ability of the husband shall have been
changed since the rendition of such judgment, either party may
apply to the court which rendered the said judgment for an
order and judgment decreasing or increasing the amount of
such alimony payments or terminating such payments, and the
court, after giving both parties an opportunity to be heard, and
to introduce evidence relevant to the issue, shall make such order and judgment as justice and equity shall require, with due
regard to the changed circumstances and the financial ability
of the husband, decreasing or increasing or confirming the
amount of alimony provided for in such original judgment, or
terminating such payments. Thereafter the husband shall pay
and be liable to pay the amount of alimony payments directed in
such order and judgment, and no other or further amount; and
such original judgment, for the purpose of all actions or proceedings of every nature and wherever instituted, whether within or without this State, shall be deemed to be, and shall be,
modified accordingly; subject in every case to a further proceeding or proceedings under the provisions of this section in relation to such modified judgment.
The ecclesiastical courts modified alimony awards which were made
in limited divorce cases according to changes in the needs of the
wife and in the ability of the husband to pay. 20 2 These changes were
allowed because alimony was merely the enforcement of the husband's duty to support his wife, and the courts held that the scope of
this duty varied with the circumstances of the parties from time to
time. Most of the American courts have refused to alter decrees
unless power to do so was reserved therein, or unless there is statutory sanction. 203 This rule is apparently predicated on the theory
that the decree is res ajudicata as to alimony. Approximately onehalf of the American jurisdictions are still without statutes which
permit modifications.2 0 4 Section 11 eliminates the possibility of such
a problem in South Carolina because it authorizes changes in the

202,

2 VZRNIER, AmERICAN FAMILY LAWS §

106;

MADDEN,

PERSONS AND

DoMEsTIc RaATxoNs §§ 97, 98.
203. Banda v. Banda, 192 Ga. 5, 14 S. E. 2d 479 (1941) ; Fisch v. Marler, 1
Wash. 2d 698, 97 P. 2d 147 (1939); WARREN, SCHOULER DivoRcE MANUAl,
§271.
204. 2 V_ zNsR, AymRICAN FAmIY LAWS § 106.
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award. Factors which the court might properly consider when being petitioned for a modification are: changes in the financial status
of the husband and wife,205 the needs of the wife,208 remarriage of
the husband,20 7 diligence of the husband in paying,208 prevailing economic conditions, number of children begotten by the husband by
the second wife, 2° 9 and the spouses' conduct 21 0
Most of the states which permit revision of alimony awards hold
that past due payments are not subject to change because they become vested when due and payable.21 1 Other courts hold that the
2 12
power to revise extends to past due as well as to future installments.
The tenor of Section 11 indicates that it was the intent of the Legislature to permit the court to modify as to past due installments. This
statement is supported by the following sentence which appears in
Section 11:
Thereafter the husband shall pay and be liable to pay the amount
of alimony payments directed in such order and judgment and
no other or further amount; and such original judgment, for the
purpose of all actions or proceedings of every nature and wherever instituted, whether within or without this state, shall be
deemed to be, and shall be, modified accordingly; ....
It is the general rule, in the absence of an express statute, that
alimony in gross is not subject to revision.2 13 Apparently the Legislature has provided for this view in South Carolina by its silence in
respect to the modification of lump sum allotments. Section 11
by its wording, is applicable only to periodic payments of alimony.

205. Handsaker v.Handsaker, 223 Iowa 462, 272 N. W. 609 (1937) ; Schwein

v. Schwein, 233 Mich. 67, 206 N. W. 353 (1925) ; Smith v. Smith, 50 R. I. 278,
146 Adt. 626 (1920); Matzke v. Matzke, 185 App. Div. 533, 173 N. Y. Supp.
244 (1918).
206. Jones v. Jones, 199 Ark. 1000, 137 S. W. 2d 238 (1940) ; Rood v.Rood,
280 Mich. 33, 273 N. W. 337 (1937) ; Parker v. Parker, 189 App. Div. 603, 179
N. Y. Supp. 51 (1919).
207. Morris v. Morris, 240 Ala. 399, 199 So. 803 (1941); Lamborn v. Lamborn, 80 Cal. App. 494, 251 Pac. 943 (1926) ; Dietrick v. Dietrick, 99 N. J.Eq.
711, 134 Atl. 338 (1926).
208. Richman v. Richman, 246 App. Div. 885, 285 N. Y. Supp. 26 (1936);
Rigney v. Rigney, 62 N. J.Eq. 8, 49 Ati. 460 (1901).
209. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DomtsTic RMATIONS §§ 97, 98.
210. WARREN, ScnouR DivoRcz MANUAL §§ 283, 284.
211. Beers v. Beers, 74 Wash. 458, 133 Pac. 605 (1913) ; McGregor v. McGregor, 52 Colo. 292, 122 Pac. 39 (1912).
212. Hartigan v.Hartigan, 171 N. W. 925 (Minn.1919); Linton v.Linton,
89 Misc. 560, 149 N. Y. Supp. 385 (1914); WARREN, SCHOuLaR DIvoCRc
MANUAL § 273.

App.32 (1915); WAMMN, SCHOULER DivoRcE
213. Martin v. Martin, 195 Ill.
MANUAL § 273.
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SECTION 12. Wife Barred of Dower in Husband's Land
After Final Decree.-On the granting of any final decree of divorce, the wife shall thereafter be barred of dower in lands formerly oNned, then owned, or thereafter acquired by her former
214
husband.
At an early date Lord Coke made the following statement on dower:
Concerning the seisin, it is not necessary that the same should
continue during coverture; for, albeit the husband aliens the
lands or tenements, or extinguishes the rents or commons, and,
yet the woman shall be endowed. But it is not necessary that the
marriage do continue; for if that be dissolved, the dower ceases
215
ubi nullum matrintoniumn, ibi nulla dos.
At the time that Coke made this statement there was no divorce
dissolving a valid marriage. Nevertheless, the doctrine stated by
Lord Coke is the well-established rule in this country in the absence
of a statute to the contrary.2 16 The reason for this rule is that the
common law never recognized any dower right unless the woman
were covert at the time her husband died. Since a divorce a vincula
nuorimonii puts an end to the marriage, whatever hangs on the marriage falls with it. Also, it can be said that a wife does not have a
vested interest in her husband's real property, but only the possibility
of an interest, contingent on surviving him. There can be no survivorship without death, and the death of a man not her husband
(because of the divorce) cannot make her a survivor so as to entitle her to dower. Section 12 is merely a reiteration of the established common law rule on this point. This rule which is generally
2 17
followed has been changed by statute in many states.

SECTION 13. Not Grant Divorce Where Parties Colluded or
Act Complained of Did with Knowledge or Assent of Plaintiff
to Obtain Divorce.-If it shall appear, to the satisfaction of the
Court, that the parties to said divorce proceedings colluded or
that the act complained of was done with the knowledge or assent
of the plaintiff for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, then the
Court shall not grant such divorce.

214. As amended by 46 S. C.S'AT. AT LARGE (1950).

215. COKE Liu. 32a.
216. 2 BisHop, MARRIAGE

217.

AND DVoRcE §§ 705-711.
2 VERNIER, AmERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 99.
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There were four general defenses which were allowed to be pleaded in divorce actions in the ecclesiastical courts. They were: condonation, connivance, recrimination and collusion. These general defenses were so firmly established in England that they were recognized by the English Chancery Courts upon their creation and thereafter became imbedded in the common law. They have been recognized in this country since the American courts first started granting divorces. It is true that these defenses were a bar to divorces
a inenso et thoro which were awarded by the ecclesiastical courts,
and not a bar to absolute divorces because no such dissolutions were
given by those courts. Even so, they have always been used in connection with divorces a vinculo matrimonii because of their having
been crystalized into the common law. Many states have codified
the principles of these defenses into statutes, while others have no
legislative acts on them. But the legislative deficiency has not prevented the courts from recognizing them in divorce actions. Collusion and connivance are prescribed as barriers to divorce actions in
South Carolina. Howeve-, unless the South Carolina Supreme
Court should depart from the practices of the other courts in this
country, it will still deny relief where there has been condonation or
recrimination even though the Divorce Act is silent as to these two
principles. The fact that the South Carolina Court will recognize
these other two defenses is evidenced by the decision in the -ecent
case of Jeffords v. Jeffords.21 8 In that case the Court discussed recrimination at length, but did not decide whether it is a good defense to a divorce action in this state. By this discussion, wasn't
the Court paving the way for the embodiment of this principle into
our divorce law? A definition and discussion of these four general
defenses will now be undertaken.
Condonation. Condonation is the conditional forgiveness or remission by one spouse of some matrimonial offense of which he or she
knows the other to be guilty.2 19 The act of forgiveness is based
upon the implied condition that the guilty party will thereafter treat
the pardoning spouse with conjugal kindness. This pardon can be
either expressed or implied. However, the act of forgiving must
be done after the innocent party has acquired knowledge of the wrongful offense committed by the wrongdoer.2 20 There can be no remis218. 216 S. C. 451, 58 S. E. 2d 731 (1950).

219.

WARREN, SCROULER DIvOac MANUAL § 154; MADDEN, PEsoNs AND
DoMtsTIc R LATiONS § 90.
220. 2 BIsHop, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 38; WARREN, SCHOULER DIVoRcE
MANUAL § 156.
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sion unless there be knowledge of some wrong having been committed. A mere suspicion or even proof that the innocent spouse has
heard rumors of the other spouse's wrongdoing are held not to be
sufficient notice so as to make out condonation.2 21 And some courts
have gone so far as to hold that a sincere belief in the innocence of
the other spouse is enough to obviate the finding of condonation.
As was pointed out above, condonation can be expressed or implied.
Thus, it can take the form of express words, although such an expression is not required. Forgiveness is conclusively implied where
the innocent spouse cohabits with the other after having acquired the
necessary knowledge.
And sexual intercourse with knowledge of
the wrong, but without cohabitation, amounts to condonation.A
However, letters of affection, though written in endearing terms, are
not alone proof of remission2 25 The pardon must be voluntary in
order to be a bar to a divorce action. If it is brought about by force,
22s
fraud or fear, then the forgiveness is not valid as a defense.
The remission is conditional and if the forgiven spouse is thereafter guilty of marital misconduct the forgiveness is blotted out and
the old act is revised.2 27 Once the act is revived it can thereafter
be used as a ground for a divorce action.2 28 It is to be noted that
any marital misconduct and not just a repetition of the original offense nullifies condonation. The marital misconduct which can revive a condoned offense need not be a ground for divorce, i. e., mere
lack of conjugal kindness is sufficient.2 2 9 Where there is condonation it is an absolute barrier to all divorce actions founded on that
particular grievance unless the condition is broken. And condonation is a defense even though it occurs after the action has been filed
and started. The courts favor condonation and will always refuse
relief upon a proper showing of it. Such favortism is another in221. Michler v. Duckman, 159 La. 478, 105 So. 559 (1925) ; Gosser v. Gosser,
183 Pa. 499, 38 Atl. 1014 (1898).
222. Phillips v. Phillips, 221 Ala. 455, 129 So. 3 (1930)..
223. Pepin v. Pepin, 123 Misc. 888, 206 N. Y. Supp. 732 (1924) ; Stanley v.
Stanley, 115 Ga. 99, 42 S. E. 374 (1902).
224. Rogers v. Rogers, 67 N. J. Eq. 534, 58 Atl. 822 (1904); Need v. Need,
62 Ark. 611, 37 S. W. 230 (1896). Contra: Weber v. Weber, 195 Mo. App.
126, 189 S. W. 577 (1916).
225. Hunter v. Hunter, 132 Cal. 473, 64 Pac. 772 (1901).
226. -arley v. Farley, 278 Mich. 361, 270 N. W. 711 (1936) ; McGovern v.
McGovern, 111 N. J. Eq. 18, 160 Atl. 822 (1932); Rex v. Rex, 39 Ohio App.
295, 177 N. E. 527 (1930).
227. WARRn

, Sc-otuia DivoRCa

MANUAL §

154; 2 Bisirop,

MARIAG

AND

DIvoRCE § 33.

228. WAuN, ScHouLER DIvoRa MANUAL § 163.
229. Hilbert v. Hilbert, 168 Md. 364, 177 Atl. 914 (1935); 2 BisHop, MARPlAGE AND Divoacs § 53.
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dication of the state's vital interest in the matrimonial status of its
citizens.
Connivance. Connivance is the corrupt consent of a married party
to the conduct of the other and of which he afterwards complains. 230
It bars the right to a divorce because no injury has been received;
for what a man has consented to, he cannot thereafter set up as an
injury. In speaking of connivance Lord Stowell once said, "In that
case, the general rule of law comes in, that volenti non fit injuria,no
injury has been done, and therefore, there is nothing to redress." 2'3
Connivance is closely kin to collusion but differs therefrom in one
large measure. Collusion is actual or attempted fraud on the court
because the parties agree for one of them to commit, or appear to
commit, a certain act or else they agree to represent to the court that
2 2
one of them has committed an act which is ground for divorce.
There is no agreement with connivance. As a matter of fact the defendant need not have known of the connivance of the plaintiff at the
time of the act.2 3 Thus, there can be connivance without collusion,
but where there is collusion there is generally connivance. Connivance is available as a defense in all types of divorce cases, but it is
largely used in suits where the defendant has been guilty of committing adultery.23 4 It can take the form of active procuring or of passive permitting,23 5 and is comparable to entrapment in criminal law.
Recrimination. Recrimination is a countercharge in a suit for divorce that the complainant has been guilty of an offense constituting
a ground for divorce in the jurisdiction in which the action has been
brought.23 6 The doctrin6 has as its foundation the old equitable
principle that one who asks relief must come into court with a clear
conscience and with clean hands. It is also allowed as a defense to
a divorce action on the theory that divorce is a remedy for an innocent and injured spouse and not for a guilty one. In the ecclesiastical
courts only adultery could be set up by way of recrimination. However, today any act can be set up so long as it is one that the law

230. 2 BIsHop, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 5; WARREsN, ScHouLta DiVORCZ
MANUAL § 164.
231. See 2 BIsHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 5.
232. See Collusion, infra.
233. Noyes v. Noyes, 194 Mass. 20, 79 N. E. 814 (1907).
MARRIAGS AND DIVoRcz § 5.

234. 2 BisHoP,

235. Morrison v. Morrison, 142 Mass. 361, 8 N. E. 59 (1886);
SCHou
DIVoRaC MANuAL § 164.
236.

2 BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DivoRcE

Published by Scholar Commons, 1951

WARREN,

§ 78.

45

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 3 [1951], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA

LAW QUARTERLY

declares sufficient for divorce.2$ 7 It need not even -be a charge of the
same nature as that alleged in the complaint.2,
In the very recent South Carolina case of Jeffords v. Jeffords23 9
the defendant amended her answer and inserted the following: "That
on information and belief the conduct of the plaintiff with a woman
or women other than his lawful wife has been such that would deprive him of a divorce on his own volition". The court held that this
allegation was insufficient to set up the defense of recrimination.
Though the court did not expressly so state, it implied that this allegation did not spell out an offense which was a ground for divorce
in South Carolina. However, the case was remanded and the defendant was given another opportunity to amend.
The order in time of the offenses of the defendant and plaintiff
are unimportant. The act by the plaintiff can be committed subsequent to the one alleged against the defendant. Moreover, the countercharge by the defendant can even be made when the act of the
plaintiff occurs during the pendency of the case.2 40 An act by the
plaintiff prior to the one alleged against the defendant usually could
not be set up because of condonation. However, if there has been
no condonation because of a lack of knowledge, etc., then it could
be used. The courts have had some trouble in determining whether
an offense by the plaintiff, which has been condoned by the defendant,
can be set up by way of recrimination. Under the better and prevailing view the courts say it cannot.2 41 If condonation blots out a wrong
(unless there is a broken condition), it should be forgiven for all
purposes. Condonation is an absolute bar to a divorce action, and,
therefore, the remission of an act should preclude the setting up of
the act by way of recrimination.
Some courts, though they are few in number, have established a
doctrine of comparative rectitude to be used with recrimination.2 42
These courts do not hold that recrimination is an absolute defense
to a divorce action, but rather they look to the degree of fault of each
of the parties. The spouse who is less at fault is awarded a divorce.
The only difficult feature of comparative rectitude is deciding where
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the line is to be drawn. As can be imagined, the scales are difficult
to read in such cases. Most of the courts have renounced this theory
and hold that recrimination is an absolute defense and neither party is
given relief.2 4 3 In so doing the judges seem to stick their tongues
in their cheeks for such conduct. Other courts manage to find exceptional circumstances which wvarrant relief in many cases and thus
they follow their consciences, though there may be some evasion of
the law. There are many cases--where the parties are so hopelessly
split that they will never be reconciled. Hatred for each other has
caused a permanent barrier .to come between them as man and wife.
If relief is refused such people, has justice been rendered? In too
many of these cases there are children in the family. A new home
could in many instances be established for these children if the parent,
in whose custody they are placed, could remarry. However, the defense of recrimination prevents this. Cases involving these points
are the ones which give rise to the so-called exceptions to the doctrine
of recrimination.2 4 These exceptions actually amount to nothing
more than a weighing of the equities and circumstances involved in
such cases. Though the doctrine of comparative rectitude be difficult
to administer in some cases, it at least renders justice often times
where without it injustice would be promoted. It might be that all
courts in effect apply the doctrine of comparative rectitude where
there is recrimination, though such an admission is never made. The
South Carolina Court discussed the general principles of recrimination in the Jeffords case, without affirmatively deciding whether it is
a defense in this state. In this case recognition was also given to the
exceptions which exist under the modern decisions.
Collusion. Collusion is- a corrupt agreement between the husband
and wife for the doing of certain acts for the purpose of enabling one
of them to obtain a divorce that could not otherwise be obtained.24 5
Collusion implies action in concert and is in effect conspiracy between
the parties to impose fraud on the court. Under these meanings there
is collusion where the spouses agree to present untrue facts to the
2 47
court,2 46 agree to do acts which will constitute a ground for divorce
or where they agree to suppress material evidence.2 48 In recent months
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there has been much publicity concerning the vacation of a large
number of divorce decrees in New York where adultery is the only

ground for divorce. Not being able to obtain a dissolution of the
marriage, many spouses have fraudulently agreed to testify that one
of them has committed adultery so as to be able to obtain a divorce.
Others have created sham scenes with paid witnesses being present.
These are typical examples of collusion. Where there is such a corrupt agreement the courts will refuse to grant a divorce to either of
the spouses. If the divorce has been awarded before the conspiracy is
learned of, the court may in its discretion vacate the decree.2 9
Collusion is specifically stated in Section 13 as a defense in South
Carolina.
SECION 14. Enjoin Parties.-The Couit, pending the termination of the action, or by final order, may restrain or enjoin
either party to the case, from in any manner interposing any
restraint upon the personal liberty of, or from harming, interfeing with, or molesting the other party to said cause during
the pendency of said suit, or after final judgment. It may also,
during the pendency of such action, restrain or enjoin any other
person who is made a party to the action from doing or threatening to do any act calculated to prevent or interfere with a reconciliation of the husband and wife, or other amicable adjustment
of the action.
This section is self explanatory and no extensive comment will be
made on it. Actually we cannot say that the injunctions mentioned
in this section are ones which are usually issued by a court of equity.
Equity, for historical reasons, mostly seeks to protect property rights
rather than personal rights. However, there is certainly a modem
tendency by the courts in this country to extend protection to personal
rights. Section 14 is in accord with this new tendency. The section
is highly desirable and gives the court ample power to deal with nagging wives, bullying husbands and intermeddlers. This is another
section that is probably superfluous due to the court's inherent power,
if it chose to exercise it, to give protection along these lines. However, the Legislature has seen fit to expressly grant such power to
the courts.
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SECTION 15. Name of Wife Divorced.-The Court may, upon
granting of final judgment, allow a wife to resume her maiden
name or the name of any former husband.
It is to be noted that the right of the wife to change her name is
a matter which rests entirely in the discretion of the Court. Unless
the rights of third parties would be affected, or unless there would
be a danger of embarrassing children the Court should grant any
change of name requested by the wife. The statutes in other states
on this matter vary greatly. However, there are four other states
which have broad provisions similar to South Carolina's. 2 50 It would
seem that the grant of a broad discretionary power to the Court is
desirable. The Judge is familiar with the facts and can, therefore,
make a proper decision. The Judges of the Circuit Courts of this
state have been given great latitude by statute to change names.&2 51
Therefore, this section was probably not needed. However, it does
expressly settle the question of whether the wife is entitled to take
certain names.

SECTION 16. Married Person Deemed of Age.-Any married person shall, for the purpose of maintaining or defending
an action for divorce and settlement of property rights arising
thereunder, be deemed of age.
It is a general principle of law that a person under age, an infant
in the law, can sue or defend in Court only with the aid of a guardian
or friend.2 52 This rule has been applied to divorce suits and allied
matters in some jurisdictions.2 53 The reason for this rule appears
to be that the infant is not deemed competent to manage his own
affairs and should therefore be protected in such matters by a guardian or friend. It would seem that this argument, even assuming
that it is correct and in line with public policy, should not be applicable to married infants. If a person under legal age is permitted
by law to marry and to shoulder the responsibilities attached thereto,
reason would seem to dictate that such a person would be able to'
seek or defend a divorce suit without the assistance of a friend or
guardian. As has been pointed out by one authority, no friend was
needed for the courtship or marriage, so why should there be a need
of one when a divorce is at stake. This same reasoning would also
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appear to be true of property questions and other allied matters which
arise in conjunction with the suit for dissolution of the marriage.
Such thoughts were evidently in the minds of the members of the
Legislature when Section 16 was enacted. It is a good section and
is a good exception to the law on infants.

SECTION 17. Not Advertise, Print, Distribute or Circulate
Paper to Procure or to Aid in Procuring a Divore.-It shall
be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to advertise,
print, publish, distribute, circulate or cause to be advertise'd,
printed, published, distributed, or circulated, any card, handbill,
advertisement, printed paper, book, newspaper, or notice of any
kind with an attempt to procure ok to aid in procuriing any divorce either in the State of South Carolina, or elsewhere; Provided, However, that this section shall not apply to the printinfg
or publishing of any.notice or advertisement required or authorized by the laws of South Carolina.
We are all too familiar with the Mexican divorce mills that aid in
the procuring of divorces. As a matter of fact these concerns widely advertise the availability of their services in such matters. Without such a provision as Section 17, individuals or firms would undoubtedly try to traffic in this trade in South Carolina. Since the
state is vitally interested in the marital status of its citizens, public
policy frowns upon the practices prohibited by Section 17. It should
be noted that this section is applicable to individuals, firms and corporations.
SECTION 18. Penalties Violate § 17.-Any person, firm or
corporation violating any of the provisions of Section 17 shall,
upon conviction, be punished for each offense by a fine of not
less than One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars, and not more than
One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars, or imprisonment for not
less than one (1) month or more than one (1) year, or both
such fine and such imprisonment, at the discretion of the Court.

Sections 19, 20 and 21 pertain to the repeal of inconsistent
Acts, the separability of the Act and the time the Act is to become effective.
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